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 Executive Summary 
 
Canada is struggling to fully develop, sell and move its energy resources. This is a dramatic 
change from the recent past where the U.S. has provided stable growth in demand for energy 
supplied by the provinces, from hydrocarbons to electricity. Current circumstances now 
challenge this relationship, adding environmental, policy and economic hurdles that exacerbate 
the impact of fluctuations in world demand and pricing. 
 
In addition, competitive interaction between provinces, aboriginal land owners and special 
interest groups complicate and compound the issues of royalty returns, regulatory authority and 
direction, land-use management and long-term market opportunities for Canadian companies. 
There is no strategic document guiding the country’s energy future. 
 
As the steward of one of the largest, most diverse and valuable energy "banks" in the world, 
Canada has a unique opportunity to exploit a critical and valuable economic niche in the world 
economy. Given the lack of federal leadership and the tendency for each province to undercut 
each other in the same marketplace, there is also the distinct possibility the nation will squander 
the opportunity.  
 
This document offers the rationale for a comprehensive energy strategy, literally a vision where 
Canada can lead and not follow opportunities in energy markets. This strategic approach to 
energy systems by definition will include transportation, housing, employment and financial 
markets. It is not a plan, not a foil for tax or policy guidance in one or more sectors. This strategy 
is a fundamental rail on which plans, tactics and policies can be built. This vision identifies how 
the provinces can work together using all the tools available to them, maximizing long-term 
resource development while minimizing environmental damage.  
 
This document assumes there can be a broad commitment and effort by the federal government 
to help build those tools, providing guidance and assistance where needed without obstructing 
or denying the fundaments of the Canadian Constitution, First Nations people, and the role of 
provinces in managing the resources within their borders. This recommended energy strategy 
highlights changes occurring in world markets that threaten successful, coherent energy policy 
development in the absence of a unifying strategy. This strategy highlights the need to look 
ahead, understand these changes, and create adaptive, unifying processes that will provide long-
term economic and geopolitical stability using energy as the common denominator for Canada's 
future.  
  
Federal elections may be good for dem cracy, but the campaigns — particularly the lengthy one ecen ly
held in Canada — can be crippling for plans to bette  arm our mi itary. Just before the electio  was
called, there were public signs of important progress being made in what has long been a frustratingly 
slow and bureaucratically complex procurement process. But then the campaign left the Department 
of National Defence and other federal departments unable to secure approvals from either a defence 
minister or the Treasury Board, until the election ended and the new prime minister appointed the 
current cabinet. 
There had already been upheaval prior to that: In the first seven months of 2015, the three senior leaders 
at the Canadian Forces and the Defence Department (including the minister) had been replaced, along 
with many other people critical to the procurement process. In addition, there had been changes in the 
Public Works Department and the Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat.
Frustrating and disappointing delays have long been a matter of course in Canada’s defence procurement 
process. In 2014/15, the number of ministerial or Treasury Board approvals to allow projects to proceed 
was half of that in 2009/10. Yet the demand for approvals has not abated.
In addition to the turnover of key figures involved in the procurement and approval process, delays 
have come from a number of major steps added to the process, making an already lengthy and 
complex system even more so. To be sure, these steps were added in the pursuit of improved financial 
management and project manageme t, with the aim of addressing longstanding problems. But it will 
ake years to ee if those objectiv s have been realized. 
An irony here is that the budget for military procurement has increased. Between 2004 and 2009, the 
Defence Department’s procu me t budget nearly doubled. But the funding was never matched by 
he ca acity to manage it. In 2003, the Material Group had a ratio of 2,600 staff for every $1 billion
in procurement f ds. By 2009, t  ratio had become 1,800 staff for every $1 billion i  procurement 
funds. Since then, the ratio has only gotten substantially worse.
N w systems now require extensive analysis to determine if  a more intensive Treasury Board
review is required. A recently created panel designed to provide a “third-party challenge function” 
on requirements for major procurements has created some confusion among officials as to what 
documentation they should be producing to support procurement initiatives. And the panel’s terms 
of reference are extensive, ranging from evaluating a project’s alignment with government policy and 
the level of its fit with allies’ capabilities, to the role of Canadian suppliers and the anticipated support 
concept.
Still, there are some indications that changes enacted in 2014 to the procurement process may 
eventually help mitigate delays in the future. There are continual improvements being made to the 
way the Defence Department conducts project costing as well as how the Treasury Board Secretariat 
evaluates the costs, which will help improve the compatibility between estimates and newly introduced 
frameworks. New methods of better prioritizing projects have also been introduced. And there are plans 
underway intended to reduce the time involved in the department’s internal approval processes. For 
now, however, these attempts at improvement have been focused on the lower-dollar-figure approvals 
done by the minister. It remains to be seen if, first, they work, and secondly, if they can then be used to 
facilitate Treasury Board approvals, as well.
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This report is the third edition of the annual status report on selected major defence acquisitions. It retains the focus from that of the 2014 edition of providing “a comprehensive yet concise and readily understandable reference that clearly states: What major defence acquisition commitments have been made and why; 
what progress has been made on those acquisitions and what is their current status; and 
why it may be that stated and actual delivery dates differ.”1 The intent is to provide an 
informative document that can assist anyone who is interested in tracking progress on military 
acquisitions.2
Two groups of projects were chosen for this edition. Those in Annex 1, summarized below, are 
from the list of projects included in the Department of National Defence’s Report on Plans and 
Priorities 2015/2016, Status Report on Major Crown Projects.3 This list was selected because 
it is by definition the list of projects that the Department of National Defence (DND) and the 
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) identify as the most important projects over the $100 million, 
Major Crown Project threshold. There remains an element of subjectivity in their selection 
for inclusion in the Status Report by DND, as the projects are chosen based on their assessed 
importance to the Government of Canada, 4 but the inclusion of this list in its entirety removes 
the element of subjectivity from the author of this report in determining which projects 
to include, and which to not. Of note, this list focuses exclusively on projects for defence 
equipment, and therefore excludes infrastructure, information management and information 
technology and contracts for services. The ten projects with a check mark () beside them 
appeared in the previous iteration of this report. 
The projects in Annex 2 are those that appear in both the 2015 and 2014 Defence Acquisition 
Guide.5 This publication arose as part of the 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy in an effort 
to better inform the defence industry about potential future defence purchases. As many of the 
projects have not yet received formal approvals, the focus was placed on those projects that the 
main capability sponsors within DND, the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 
and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) are actively working on. 
These two lists are largely complementary. Although there are some overlap and exceptions, 
each Annex focuses on projects at different stages in the procurement process, which has five 
primary stages: Identification; Options Analysis; Definition; Implementation and Close Out. 
1 Elinor Sloan. Something Has to Give (Calgary: The Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, The School of Public Policy, 
University of Calgary, and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2014)
2 
The first report in this series was David Bercuson, Aaron Plamondon and Ray Szeto, An Opaque Window. (Calgary: Canadian 
Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2006).
3 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Report on Plans and Priorities 2015/2016 (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 2015). 
4 
Confidential Interview. 
5 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2015, June 25, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/
en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/naval-systems.page, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence 
Acquisition Guide 2014, June 25, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide/joint-systems.page
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According to the 2015 Defence Acquisition Guide, the five stages of the procurement process 
can be summarized as follows (see Figure 1 as well):
• Stage 1 - Identification.
• Stage 2 - Options Analysis.
• Stage 3 - Definition.
• Stage 4 - Implementation.
• Stage 5 - Close-Out.
While there have been some significant changes made to the procurement process after 2009, 
discussed below, much of the process remains the same. It involves, at a minimum, the full 
Cabinet, the Treasury Board (the subset of Cabinet responsible for financial management), the 
Treasury Board Secretariat (the bureaucracy that supports the Treasury Board), DND, Public 
Works and Government Services Canada (the federal department responsible for purchasing 
defence goods). In the Project Identification stage, a capability deficiency or gap is identified 
by one of the many project sponsors in the CAF, of which the Army, RCN and RCAF are the 
three largest. During this stage, the potential risks of addressing the capability deficiency, 
potential funding sources and the policy coverage are all identified. If the proposal to address 
the capability deficiency is approved by the Defence Capability Board, it officially becomes 
a project. These new projects enter the Options Analysis stage, where the Statement of 
Operational Requirement is developed, and the optimal method to addressing the capability gap 
is identified. This includes an assessment of the costs and benefits of options, engagements with 
industry and the identification of the preferred option. 
At the end of Options Analysis the project is put forward for Preliminary Project Approval 
for expenditure authority by either the Minister of National Defence or the Treasury Board. 
Prior to 2009, whether a project was approved by the Treasury Board or Minister of National 
Defence, it was determined by the project’s estimated costs; those over $30 million required 
the Treasury Board’s approval. If Preliminary Project Approval is granted, this marks the 
transition from determining what should be done to mitigate a deficiency, to determining how 
the preferred option will be implemented. This approval also means that the project is assigned 
‘Vote 5’ Capital funding, the special financial authorities used when the capital expenditures in 
a program equal or exceed $5 million6 - some of which is used to stand up a dedicated project 
management team, which determines substantive requirements, cost and schedule estimates as 
well as investigating and mitigating risk. At the end of this process, a project goes forward for 
Effective Project Approval, to either the Minister of National Defence or the Treasury Board 
based on the same cost threshold as above. If secured, the project enters the Implementation 
stage which enables the Department of National Defence to have the contract awarded through 
Public Works and Government Services Canada. As equipment is delivered, the project 
eventually reaches an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) which in project management terms 
is the milestone reached when the capability provided by the project can be used operationally 
on a sustained basis. The next meaningful milestone is Full Operational Capability (FOC), 
which is the milestone reached when all project deliverables have been delivered. At that point, 
6 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Examining Public Spending (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services, 2012).
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the project turns into a capability that is managed by the DND organizations responsible for 
equipment maintenance and sustainment. At that point, the project approving authority will 
receive a final report during the Close-Out stage of each project.7  
The projects in Annex 1 are mostly in the latter stages of the procurement process (either 
Definition or Implementation) whereas the projects in Annex 2 are largely in the earlier 
stages (Project Identification or Options Analysis). In combination, these two lists provide a 
comprehensive and objective picture of the most important and current Major Crown Projects 
as well as those future projects that DND is actively staffing. While this does not provide an 
exhaustive list of all defence equipment projects that might be of interest to some readers, it 
provides broad coverage of most projects of concern, without any subjective judgments on the 
part of the author about which projects to examine, which might otherwise bias the analysis. 
Notable Procurement Progress since September 2014
• In November 2014, contracts were awarded to General Dynamics Canada for both the 
design and build and In-Service Support of the anchor stations for the Mercury Global 
project, a Wideband Global Satellite Communications System. 
• As of late 2014, the submarines acquired through the Submarine Capability 
Life Extension entered the “operational” phase of their life cycle: 
HMCS Windsor, Victoria, and Chicoutimi  
• The Government of Canada announced it would acquire a fifth C17 on December 19, 
2014 and the aircraft was delivered March 30, 2015
• On January 23, 2015, the build contract for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship was 
awarded, and full construction started September 1, 2015
• In January 2015, the Government of Canada announced that Irving Shipbuilding 
would be the prime contractor for the Canadian Surface Combatant. On May 1, 2015 
the “Most Competitive Procurement Strategy” for the project was announced and the 
selection process for the project’s Combat Systems Integrator and Warship Designer 
was launched
• In January 2015, the Halifax Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension project 
reached Initial Operating Capability and two modernized ships have deployed 
operationally
• On March 31, 2015, the Request for Proposals for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue 
Aircraft was released 
• The Medium Range Radar contract was awarded to Rheinmetall Canada on July 27, 
2015
• On June 19, 2015, the first 6 Block I Cyclone Maritime Helicopters were accepted by 
the Government of Canada 
• On July 16, 2015, the contract for the Standard Military Pattern portion of the 
Medium Support Vehicle System project was awarded to Mack Defense
7 This section is based on the National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2015, June 25, 2014 
and the Department of National Defence, Project Approval Directive 2015 (Ottawa: 2015).
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Notable Delays As of October 2015, on the projects to acquire:
• Joint Support Ship Project 
• Canadian Surface Combatant 
• Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft 
• Force Mobility Enhancements
• Lightweight Towed Howitzers
• Medium to Heavy Lift Helicopter
• Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle 
Of the 59 Active Projects in the Defence Acquisition Guide Examined: 
• 3 per cent are Early
• 34 per cent are On Schedule 
• 63 per cent are Late. 
DEFENCE PROCUREMENT UPDATE
Past iterations of this publication have noted several problematic aspects of Canadian defence 
procurement that persist to this day, and delayed several of the projects discussed in detail 
below. This includes multiple issues related to military operational requirements, such as 
producing numerous Statement of Operational Requirements that were perceived to be written 
with particular suppliers in mind (see the discussion of Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft 
below); articulating requirements that industry could not produce within the assigned budget 
(Joint Support Ship); and misstating the degree to which military requirements could be met 
with already proven, “Off the Shelf,” technology (Maritime Helicopter). Similarly, concerns 
about the accuracy of project costing (Future Fighter Capability) and accounting for changes 
to initial rough order of magnitude cost estimates over time (Medium Support Vehicle System) 
have been problematic. As well, many authors have argued that Canada’s defence procurement 
system, which disperses ministerial responsibility amongst multiple government departments 
is the root of much difficulty. These authors contend that creating a single agency to procure 
defence equipment would improve procurement significantly. 8 Others, however, contest the 
notion that this would improve the situation.9
To the extent that these issues were problematic at the time last year’s update was written, they 
largely remain so today. This is because the projects listed in Annex 1, were all initiated years 
ago under a procurement system featuring the limitations identified above. There are other 
ongoing sources of delay that are not new in the past year, but worth noting. At the same time, 
there have been new sources of delay arising specifically since September 2014, when the last 
version of this report was published, which will be described below. The author attended the 
8 Sloan, Something Has to Give, Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement (Kingston: Breakout Education 
Network, 2006), Dan Ross, “So Defence Procurement Is It Broken Again Or Is This Just Normal?” On Track. 18. 2: (2014). 
9 J.C. Stone, A Separate Defence Procurement Agency. (Calgary: Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Institute, 2012) and Pierre Lageuex, “Fixing defence procurement,” The Hill Times March 22, 2010.
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Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries Canadian Armed Forces Outlooks 
in April 2015, and one of the most common laments from participants was the increase in the 
amount of ‘process’ involved with defence procurement and the resulting delay associated with 
dealing with these additional administrative procedures. 
The longstanding aspects of the procurement process, outlined above, are still applicable today, 
but since 2009, however, a number of major steps have been added that have significantly 
increased the work required to successfully advance a defence procurement. These are 
discussed further below, with the intent of demonstrating the complexity that has been added 
to the already lengthy defence procurement process that existed in 2008. Those mentioned here 
are not intended to be exhaustive, but illustrative of some of the more significant changes, and 
are depicted in Annex 3.
It should be noted that all of the additional processes have been added for a reason. The 
Treasury Board policies discussed below were adopted to improve upon financial and 
project management across government. The new steps introduced under the 2014 Defence 
Procurement Strategy are intended to address some of the longstanding problems with defence 
procurement in Canada, including the development of military requirements. 
Unfortunately, for the purposes of a yearly progress report, it will take several years for the 
results of those changes, positive, negative or null to become apparent. There has thus been 
little time for these measures to have any noticeable impact on the future cohort of projects 
identified in Annex 2. Given the effort needed to institutionalize these changes, which in some 
respects remain a work in progress, the changes themselves have contributed to some of the 
projects delays experienced since September 2014. It remains to be seen whether they will have 
the intended impact of ensuring the delivery of the right equipment in a timely manner.
The need for these initiatives to be successful at reducing delays is apparent. One metric 
for assessing the degree of delays in the procurement system is DND’s ability to secure 
Preliminary Project Approval or Effective Project Approval from the Minister of National 
Defence and the Treasury Board. As discussed above, these approvals are required for a project 
to enter into the Definition or Implementation stages of procurement. Since 2009, the number 
of approvals received by DND annually has fallen off dramatically. In 2014/2015 DND secured 
only half the number of combined approvals that it did in 2009/2010. Since the demand for 
these approvals has not been reduced, this has presented a significant problem.
SOURCES OF DELAY SINCE SEPTEMBER 2014
Since September 2014, there has been a significant degree of turnover in the senior leadership 
at National Defence. In January 2015, the Deputy Minister was replaced, as was DND’s 
Assistant Deputy Minister Finance/Chief Financial Officer, and the Assistant Deputy Minister 
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Materiel (the head of the Materiel Group, DND’s procurement organization).10 The next month, 
Jason Kenny replaced Rob Nicholson as the Minister of National Defence.11 In June, a new 
Chief of Force Development (the officer responsible for integrating the military’s capability 
development activities) was appointed, and then in July, General Jonathan Vance replaced 
General Tom Lawson as the Chief of Defence Staff.
 In effect, the three senior leaders in the DND and the CAF along with multiple others critical 
to the defence procurement process were replaced in the first seven months of 2015. As well, a 
transition in the Assistant Deputy Minister for Acquisitions at Public Works and Government 
Services Canada and with the chair of the Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat occurred. 
This huge degree of turnover in a short time period delayed progress on a number of files. The 
incoming leadership cohort had to be briefed on their entire slate of responsibilities, including 
individual capital equipment procurements, DND’s financial plans, of which capital equipment 
purchases form a significant component, and the list of priority projects discussed below. 
The federal election campaign that started on August 2 left DND, along with other federal 
departments, unable to secure any further Minister of National Defence or Treasury Board 
approvals until the next federal Cabinet is appointed. Thus, the 2015 Canadian federal election 
played a role in limiting progress on some files. Paradoxically, it should also be noted that much 
of the procurement progress since September 2014, was announced immediately prior to the 
start of the election. 
ONGOING SOURCES OF DELAY
An Increased Workload and a Lack of Capacity
One significant contributor to the current difficulty facing defence procurement is the mismatch 
between the procurement workload and the capacity of the defence procurement system.12 
Beginning in 1989, DND entered into a decade of cascading budget cuts as the federal 
government attempted to eliminate the deficit. Although defence spending began to rise in 
1999, it did so gradually and with little money allocated for defence procurement. This changed 
in 2005 when the Martin government pledged a $12 billion increase to the defence budget 
over five years followed closely by another $5 billion in funding a year later from the Harper 
government. A significant share of this combined budget increase was allocated to defence 
procurement. As a result, in the span of a few short years DND received a massive infusion of 
10 
Lauara Payton, “Richard Fadden named national security adviser to Stephen Harper,” CBCNews.ca , January 06, 2015 http://
www.cbc.ca/news/politics/richard-fadden-named-national-security-adviser-to-stephen-harper-1.2891626, National Defence and 
the Canadian Armed Forces, “Mr. Claude Rochette – Biography,” May 14, 2015 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/
assistant-deputy-minister-finance-corp-services-bio.page, Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, “Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper Announces Changes to the Senior Ranks of the Public Service,” January 26, 2015  
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/01/26/pm-announces-changes-senior-ranks-public-service 
11 
Mark Kennedy, “Stephen Harper looks for political safety in cabinet shuffle.” Ottawa Citizen, February 9, 2015 http://
ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/jason-kenny-becomes-new-defence-minister-nicholson-moves-to-foreign-affairs 
12 This section draws on work previously published in David Perry, Putting the ‘Armed’ back into the Canadian Armed Forces 
(Ottawa: CDA Institute, 2015). See also Philippe Lagassé, Recapitalizing the Canadian Forces Major Fleets (Calgary: CIC & 
CDFAI, 2012)
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procurement funds.13 Between 2004 and 2009, for instance, DND’s procurement budget nearly 
doubled, increasing by 90 per cent after inflation.14
This increase in funding was not matched by the capacity to manage it. During the 1995 
Program Review, DND, Industry Canada, Public Works and Government Services Canada 
were amongst the small group of departments most heavily affected by public services 
downsizings. As a result, large numbers of procurement officials, including many of the 
most experienced, left the public service as Canada “significantly reduced its own capacity 
to manage...projects.”15 Auditor General reports in both 1998 and 2004, subsequently 
noted inexperience, inadequate training and insufficient staff as problems with defence 
procurements.16 
The impact on the Materiel Group is the easiest to observe by comparing the size of its 
workforce against the DND’s spending on capital equipment procurement. In 1989, the 
Materiel Group employed approximately 9,000 people performing roles comparable to 
the ones the organization performs today and that year spent roughly $3 billion on capital 
procurement, meaning there were roughly 3,000 staff working to spend each billion dollars’ 
worth of procurement funds. As a result of Program Review, by 2003 the Material Group 
had shrunk to 4,200 positions and that year spent roughly $1.6 billion on procurement, for a 
ratio of approximately 2,600 staff per one billion in procurement funds. By 2009, staffing in 
the Materiel Group had increased to 4,355, and DND spent $2.4 billion, for a ratio of 1,800 
staff per billion dollars of capital projects. Over two decades, DND’s procurement workload, 
relative to staff, has almost doubled. After 2010, this situation worsened, because the Materiel 
Group was reduced by 400 positions as part of DND’s deficit reduction measures. This was not 
matched by a commensurate reduction in the organization’s workload. 17 
How this state of affairs arose given the significant procurement demands placed on DND since 
2005 is unclear as is the extent of the mitigation measures required to address it, although both 
of these issues warrant further detailed study. There has, however, been a recognition that it is a 
problem. The most recent Departmental Performance Report from National Defence continues 
to cite “capacity”18 as one of the reasons for schedule delays, as have previous versions of 
the same document. Similarly, shortages of project staff in the Canadian Army, RCN and 
RCAF were cited as reasons for the delays in some of the projects listed in the 2015 Defence 
Acquisition Guide.19 The Materiel Group is currently attempting to hire more staff, but to date 
these efforts have not produced tangible results. The outcome of the 2015 federal election will 
13 David Perry, “A Return to Realism,” Defence Studies, 14, no. 3 (2013): 338-360 
14 This data comes from the Receiver General of Canada, The Public Accounts of Canada, Vol. II. (Ottawa: Various years) These 
were converted to $1993/1994 using the Defence Economic Model by the author.
15 CADSI Marine Industries Working Group. Sovereignty, Security and Prosperity. Ottawa: CADSI, May 2009. 34.
16 
Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Chapter 3: National Defence - Equipping and Modernizing the Canadian 
Forces. Ottawa: 1998. Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Chapter 3: National Defence - Upgrading the CF-18 
Fighter Aircraft. Ottawa: 2004 
17 This data comes from the Receiver General of Canada, The Public Accounts of Canada, Vol. II. converted to $1993/1994 using 
the Defence Economic Model by the author. See Perry, Putting the ‘Armed’ Back Into the Canadian Armed Forces 
18 DPR 2013/2014, p 40.
19 
Confidential interviews, Ottawa 2015.
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hopefully improve upon this situation, as the Liberal Party of Canada pledged to “increase the 
capacity of National Defence’s acquisition branch”20 during their campaign.
POINTS OF CONCERN
Increased Process
Treasury Board Policies
The impact of this increased workload and lack of capacity has been exacerbated by significant 
changes to the process for procuring defence equipment. In 2007 the Treasury Board 
introduced a new Policy on Investment Planning that took effect in 2009 beginning with an 
initial tranche of departments including DND.21 The intent of the policy is to achieve value 
for money and sound stewardship by ensuring “a diligent and rational manner of resource 
allocation for both existing and new assets.”22 These plans must be submitted to the Treasury 
Board Secretariat every three years, and reflect all departmental investment decisions, 
including procurement of defence equipment. 
As projects move through the stages of the procurement process, an Investment Plan Change 
Management process is used to manage the impact of changes to individual project’s costs 
on the overall investment plan. This requires an Investment Plan Change Proposal and an 
Investment Plan Change Impact Analysis. The latter document requires approval from DND’s 
Program Management Board and financial attestation from DND’s Chief Financial Officer. 
Since July 2013, if the project value exceeds $50 million, approval from the recently created 
Investment Resource Management Committee, chaired by the Deputy Minister is also required 
to make any changes. This time and labour intensive process of assessing and attesting to 
the impact of changes is needed for both Preliminary Project Approval and Effective Project 
Approval.23
DND’s first investment plan expired in 2012 and the department had difficulty securing 
approval for a follow-on document, which did not occur until June of 2014. During the 15 
months between the time DND’s first plan expired and the new one was approved, DND’s 
investment plan was ‘frozen.’ This was significant, as inclusion in the Investment Plan is 
required before projects can go forward for Preliminary Project Approval. This meant DND 
was held to the funding level in the initial document and could not introduce any projects 
with additional costs without removing projects of equal cost as an offset. As a result, in a few 
instances, previously planned projects were removed to accommodate the inclusion of new 
20 Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan to Strengthen the Economy and Create Jobs with Navy Investment (Ottawa: 2015), 3.
21 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Policy on Investment Planning - Assets and Acquired Services.” Last modified 
November 12, 2013 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18225
22 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Policy on Investment Planning - Assets and Acquired Services.” Last modified 
November 12, 2013 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18225
23 Department of National Defence, Project Approval Directive 2015 (Ottawa: 2015). National Defence and the Canadian Armed 
Forces, “Former DM Reflects on “One of the Best Jobs in Town,” February 13, 2015 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.
page?doc=former-dm-reflects-on-one-of-the-best-jobs-in-town/i6jaw8wr 
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ones. More significantly, DND built up a substantial backlog of projects that it would have 
otherwise moved into the Definition stage, but did not because the investment plan was frozen. 
The impacts of this backlog are still being felt as DND attempts to catch up for lost time.
In 2007, the Treasury Board of Canada also introduced a new Policy on the Management of 
Projects which took effect December 2009.24 The objectives of this policy are to ensure that 
the “appropriate systems, processes and controls for managing projects are in place” and 
also to “support the achievement of project and program outcomes while limiting the risk to 
stakeholders and taxpayers.”25 This process significantly changed the process for securing 
Preliminary Project Approval and Effective Project Approval, moving away from the past 
model that used project costs to determine if the Minister of National Defence or Treasury 
Board could grant the approvals. The new policy is based on a department’s capacity to manage 
projects overall and the level of risk and capacity required to successfully manage each one of 
them. 
Under the Policy on Investment Planning, departments are responsible for conducting their own 
Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment when submitting their investment 
plans. This assessment evaluates the department’s ability to manage projects, is rated on a four 
point scale and examines a number of criteria across three areas: Organizational integration; 
core project management; and supporting project management.26 DND is then responsible for 
creating a Project Complexity and Risk Assessment for each one of its projects that rates their 
“project characteristics; strategic management; procurement; human resources; business; and 
project management integration.”27 This assessment is then presented to the Treasury Board 
Secretariat, which determines whether the Minister of National Defence or Treasury Board will 
provide approval for the project. All projects with a Project Complexity and Risk Assessment 
that exceeds the Department’s Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment rating 
are automatically subject to Treasury Board review.28 
Under the initial 2009 investment plan, DND’s Organizational Project Management Capacity 
Assessment rating was three. For its investment plan approved in 2014, however, this rating 
was reduced to two. This means that projects with a rating of three which could previously go 
through a less time intensive Minister of National Defence approval process, must now go to 
the Treasury Board for Preliminary Project Approval and Effective Project Approval.
A project’s Project Complexity and Risk Assessment rating must be revised prior to moving 
into the Definition and Implementation stages. Furthermore, the department must submit a 
24 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Policy on the Management of Projects.” Last modified November 12, 2013  
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=18229&section=text#sec5.1.
25 Ibid.
26 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.” Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment Tool.” Last modified May 1, 
2013 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pm-gp/doc/ompca-ecogp/ompca-ecogp-eng.asp. 
27 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Project Complexity and Risk Assessment Tool.” Last modified May 1, 2013  
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pm-gp/doc/pcra-ecrp/pcra-ecrp-eng.asp
28 
The Treasury Board Secretariat can also decide that even projects with a Project Complexity and Risk Assessment that would 
allow the Minister of National Defence to provide an approval must be approved by the Treasury Board. Department of National 
Defence, Project Approval Directive. (Ottawa: 2015), 115.
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Project Approval Brief to the Treasury Board Secretariat if the Project Complexity and Risk 
Assessment requires that Treasury Board grant the approval. This document provides: A 
synopsis of the core project documents; describes the expected business outcomes and the 
significance of the project to achieving program and government objectives; outlines potential 
options and the performance indicators to be measured; provides an evaluation strategy that 
identifies critical project milestones, ensuring objectives are met and that value for money is 
achieved.29
In combination, the Treasury Board Policies on Investment Planning and Management of 
Projects have increased the rigour with which Canada makes investments and manages 
projects. At the same time, they have added considerably to the complexity of the defence 
procurement process.
The Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition
In addition to the changes resulting from these new Treasury Board policies, others have arisen 
with the introduction of the Defence Procurement Strategy which is intended to deliver the 
right equipment in a timely manner, leverage those purchases to create jobs and economic 
growth, as well as streamline the defence procurement processes.30 As part of this strategy, an 
Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition was created to provide “an independent, 
third-party challenge function related to the requirements for major procurements.”31 The 
panels’ mandate is therefore to help improve the generation and credibility of military 
requirements by providing advice to the Minister of National Defence and the Deputy Minister. 
As such, it is intended to address several problematic aspects of defence procurement discussed 
earlier that have been attributed to the way military requirements have been generated in the 
past. Announced in February 2014, the panel began operating in July 2015.
This challenge function is designed to occur at two points in the procurement process. The 
first occurs at the start of the Options Analysis stage. This first review examines a project’s 
Strategic Context Document, including the initial description of military requirements and 
the options identified for further examination. A second review of the project’s Business Case 
Analysis occurs later in Options Analysis, which examines the results of the options analysis, 
selection of the preferred option, and the preliminary Statement of Operational Requirement. 
Between the two reviews, the panel can also engage as necessary to ensure that issues raised 
during the first review are addressed and resolved. 
The experience suggests that it will take some time for the procurement system in National 
Defence to adapt to the review process. There appears to be some uncertainty amongst 
procurement officials regarding what type of documentation the panel needs to conduct its 
reviews, the exact scope of its mandate, and concern about the time and work involved in the 
29 Department of National Defence, Project Approval Directive 2015
30 
Public Works and Government Services Canada. “Defence Procurement Strategy.” Last modified September 8, 2014,  
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/sskt-eng.html.
31 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Terms of Reference for the Independent Review Panel for Defence 
Acquisition,” June 1, 2015 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-how-to-do/irpda-terms-of-reference.page 
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process.32 The panel’s mandate as originally announced indicated that it was to validate military 
requirements.33 The panel’s actual Terms of Reference, however, make clear that doing so 
requires assessing numerous other factors including: The projects’ alignment with government 
policy; fit with the capabilities of key allies; rationale for the options examined; the complexity 
of the proposed requirements; alignment between various requirements documents; potential 
suppliers; possible role for Canadian industry; schedule risks; anticipated support concept; cost 
drivers; and the assumptions used to estimate costs.34 Thus, to appropriately review operational 
requirements the panel has been directed to consider a multitude of other factors. 
A process of adjustment will necessarily need to occur as procurement staff gain a better 
understanding of how the panel provides its challenge function. The desired outcome is that the 
requirements for the projects presented to the Minister of National Defence or Treasury Board 
for approval are clearly and appropriately stated, which would presumably facilitate those 
approvals. Ensuring that these approvals are granted expeditiously is crucial to improving the 
overall functioning of the procurement system. This process has added some additional time to 
the Options Analysis stage for some of the first projects to come before it, although the intent is 
that this would save time later on in the Definition stage. Because of the restrictions imposed by 
the federal election and subsequent transition in government, as of this writing, none of these 
projects have gone forward for Preliminary Project Approval, making it impossible to assess 
the impact of the new challenge function on overall procurement timelines. 
Defence Procurement Strategy Governance 
Outside of DND, other changes have been introduced to implement the Defence Procurement 
Strategy. The most notable of these is the creation of an enhanced interdepartmental 
governance arrangement, all of which is led by Public Works and Government Services. This 
has seen the creation of a permanent Working Group of Ministers, chaired by the Minister 
of Public Works and Government Services, and including the ministers of National Defence, 
Industry, and International Trade. The Working Group was created “to ensure shared 
accountability in defence procurements to enable these to proceed faster and in a more efficient 
and coordinated manner.”35  It serves as a forum for advice, discussion, and issues resolution 
for major procurement projects. The Working Group is supported by a permanent Deputy 
Ministers Governance Committee that provides guidance for defence procurements and aims to 
ensure timely and appropriate decisions among competing objectives associated with particular 
procurements.36 Beneath that organization, subsequent committees of Assistant Deputy 
Ministers, Director’s General and Directors operate for projects of progressively lower cost.
32 
Confidential Interviews (Ottawa: 2015).
33 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Defence Procurement Strategy and the New DND Challenge Function,” 
February 5, 2015 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=defence-procurement-strategy-and-the-new-dnd-challenge-
function/hr7jbfih 
34 Ibid.
35 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Defence Procurement Strategy,” November 19, 2014.  
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/streamlined-eng.html 
36 Ibid.
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These committees are supported by a permanent Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat 
that undertakes and supports numerous roles including: Ensuring early engagement occurs 
with industry; developing and integrating industrial offset arrangements; developing options 
to support decision-making; using independent advice to strengthen the integrity of the 
procurement process; and using an issue resolution approach to address problems quickly 
and effectively. Finally, the Secretariat is also responsible for assessing and evaluating the 
performance of the Defence Procurement Strategy.37 These committees are generally involved 
in at least three points in the procurement process, early in Options Analysis, late in Options 
Analysis and prior to the release of a Request for Proposals. 
The Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat is still being institutionalized but has now taken 
over the functions of the secretariats that used to exist for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue 
Aircraft and the New Fighter Capability. The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy 
Secretariat, however, continues to manage the Crown’s relationships with the shipyards, while 
supporting the Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat on intergovernmental issues. At 
present, DND is still updating its internal procurement guidelines to reflect the new processes 
associated with these intergovernmental arrangements.38 
More broadly, the Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat efforts to streamline the defence 
procurement process are now underway. These are intended to reduce procurement timelines in 
all relevant components of the procurement bureaucracy, concentrating on the period between 
the start of Definition to the point a project reaches IOC in Implementation. This effort is 
crucial to reducing the procurement delays detailed below, but is nascent.
37 Ibid.
38 
Confidential Interviews, 2015.
13
2015 Status Report on Major Defence Equipment Procurements
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 2014 
Costing
While a number of changes to the process for making defence procurements have added 
potential sources of delay, at the same time some potentially beneficial changes have been 
enacted since September 2014. Improvements continue to be made to the way DND conducts 
costing of its projects as well as how the Treasury Board Secretariat evaluates these costs. 
In its most recent planning documents, DND has committed to investments in individual 
occupational training that will include the development of costing expertise, improvements to 
the DND costing handbook, and improved costing in support of DND’s investment planning 
process.39 This would all help improve DND’s ability to develop cost estimates appropriate 
for the recently adopted Treasury Board Life Cycle Cost framework. This has also required 
an expansion in the size of DND’s Assistant Deputy Minister Finance and Corporate Services 
organization, responsible for such matters, to accommodate these additional demands. 
Similarly, in 2014, the Treasury Board Secretariat began establishing a Costing Centre 
of Expertise “to improve both the capacity to challenge costs and the quality of financial 
information provided for decision making.”40 
Prioritization
Further, the impact of these improvements to DND’s costings is likely to be more significant 
than they would have been in the past given recent decisions to concentrate these scarce 
resources more strategically. Following the approval of its investment plan in 2014, DND 
moved away from a project by project procurement approach, to one focused on a portfolio 
of priority projects upon which it intends to concentrate resources. This was intended to 
help rationalize the competing project demands against the available funding room in the 
investment plan, in a way that provides the overall maximum benefit. This was initiated with 
the Capital Investment Program Plan Review process, a “comprehensive analysis process 
for assessing projects proposed for inclusion in the Investment Plan.”41 This used a project’s 
costs and a prioritized ranking of its importance based on government policy and priority, 
amongst other factors, to maximize the use of available fiscal room in the investment plan.42 
This process produced a list of key projects that could be brought into the investment plan 
which formed the basis for a final list of projects to move forward as an Options Analysis 
portfolio. At the same time, a second list of priority projects for which funding could not be 
immediately identified was also compiled. Whereas the historical project by project approach 
precluded much consideration of the holistic impact of decisions on individual projects, this 
analysis allowed a much greater discussion about the opportunity costs of advancing on some 
39 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Report on Plans and Priorities 2015-16.
40 
Treasury Board Secretariat, Report on Plans and Priorities 2014/2015 (Ottawa: 2014)  
https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2014-2015/tbd/tbd01-eng.asp 
41 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Departmental Performance Report 2013/2014 (Ottawa: 
2014), 42.
42 M. Rempel and C. Young, The Portfolio Creation Model developed for the Capital Investment Program Plan Review (CIPPR) 
Ottawa: DRDC, November 2014. http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc194/p800552_A1b.pdf 
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projects, and not others. The intent is to have the entire Options Analysis project portfolio 
approved by the Investment Resource Management Committee for inclusion in the investment 
plan as a package, and concentrate departmental resources, including costing capability, on 
this portfolio. The approval of this portfolio was delayed by the senior leadership turnover 
described above, and then the federal election.
Streamlining
Another initiative that has been under development since 2013, and recently approved, 
is the Project Approval Process Renewal. This is intended to reduce the time involved in 
DND’s internal processes for approving projects (while maintaining Treasury Board policy 
compliance) thereby increasing project throughput.43 The need to improve these processes 
stems from the recognition that a “complex departmental/Treasury Board Secretariat corporate 
submission process [the process required to secure either Preliminary Project Approval or 
Effective Project Approval]”44 is one of the factors contributing to schedule delay. The intent is 
to allow the relevant departmental committees and senior officials to select from the Options 
Analysis portfolio and projects already in the Definition or Implementation stages a second list 
of projects upon which departmental efforts to secure approvals will focus.
These efforts have been focused on the subset of DND’s overall projects that the Minister 
of National Defence has authority to approve. These less complex files represent a majority 
of DND’s projects by number, but a minority of projects by dollar value. The objective is to 
change the internal approval process at National Defence so that projects can move through 
the system without time consuming formal re-approvals at the Ministerial or senior official 
level, so long as the changes to projects as they move through their life cycle remain within 
reasonable bounds. 
This would replace an existing system that requires time and staff intensive formal re-approvals 
at the Ministerial or senior official level for even relatively minor changes to project’s costs 
or schedule, because the existing one-size fits all approval system is applied uniformly to 
both low risk and highly complex projects. If successful, it will allow for a reprioritization of 
limited staff capacity to the complex projects which require Treasury Board approvals. If the 
efforts to improve the process for securing approvals from the Minister of National Defence 
are successful, they could then be extended to the projects that must go to the Treasury Board 
as well. Given the dramatic reduction in DND’s ability to obtain approvals since 2009, making 
progress on this file is crucial.
43 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Renewal Plan. (Ottawa: 2013), 71.
44 DPR 2013/2014, p 40.
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ANNEX 1: STATUS REPORT ON MAJOR CROWN PROJECTS
This section is drawn on information published in DND’s Status Reports on Major Crown 
Projects. As for presentation style, the first page for each project itemizes the Project Budget 
for the acquisition component of the procurement where this information was obtainable,45 and 
includes a Project Description and Explanation of Variance, which articulates why deviations 
from the original schedule have occurred. The second page records the project’s progress 
according to the major procurement milestones published in the document. In the “Initial” 
column, the first publically available data on the project is included. Of note, due to the age of 
some projects there were data problems obtaining consistent records for the older projects in 
this Annex. Only the Status Reports on Major Crown Projects published since 2006/2007 are 
available on the DND website. The author used any data provided in DND’s Report on Plans 
and Priorities from previous years to supplement this information where possible, but this still 
presented an inconsistent set of data entries for the “Initial” column for older projects. 
The “2014” column shows updated data from the Report on Plans and Priorities 2014/2015, 
while the “Most Recent” column shows the most recently available information, generally the 
Report on Plans and Priorities 2015/2016. These three columns are intended to demonstrate 
progress since the project was initially included for publication, and then specifically progress 
over the last year. A dotted line through the middle of this page indicates that the program was 
significantly changed after its initial inclusion, either through cancellation or a project ‘reset’ 
and thus the data below the line is applicable to the revised project schedule only.
Where a checkmark symbol () is entered, this indicates that the milestone was achieved on 
the schedule previously indicated. Finally, this section concludes with a section specifically 
indicating Significant Progress since September 2014, the date the last iteration of this report 
was published. The data used in this Annex is primarily drawn from open sources, particularly 
the Report on Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Reports for DND. Where 
available, this was supplemented by other public sources such as Auditor General of Canada or 
DND’s Chief Review Services (the internal DND auditor) reports. 
It should be recognized that there is an information asymmetry between the projects that have 
deviated the least and the most from their original schedules. Generally only the most complex 
projects with the highest level of risk, and thus the ones most likely to be delayed, become the 
subjects of these audits. There is thus generally more information to explain delay than there is 
to explain why a project remained on schedule. 
Similarly, there was significant variation in terms of which milestones the projects reported, 
and when they first reported them. As an example, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship published 
an IOC target the first time the project was mentioned in the Status Report on Major Crown 
Projects. The Submarine Capability Life Extension, however, did not publish an IOC date until 
nine years after the project was first detailed in the Reports on Plans and Priorities in 1999, the 
45 
Data of Project Budgets was obtained from public announcements as well as the Department of National Defence Department 
Performance Report 2013/2014 (Ottawa: 2014) “Status Report on Projects Operating with Specific Treasury Board Approval,” 
November 5, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-departmental-performance/2014-status-report-tb-approval-
table.page 
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same year the contract for the vessels was signed. This type of information disparity therefore 
precluded meaningful systematic comparisons and analysis across these projects.
As well, it should also be noted that not all schedule milestones are equally important, with 
Project Close Out, for instance, less important than the others. Once a project hits FOC, the 
most significant work, requiring the most staff effort, has been completed. Often after this 
stage, the remaining tasks will be transferred over to the Equipment Program Managers in the 
Materiel Group. Often, closing out a project can take significant time after FOC is achieved 
due to the need to receive all invoices, and finalize infrastructure, force generation, and supply 
chain arrangements. The Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter project, for instance, reached 
FOC in 2004, but has not yet been closed out. Two other projects in this list, the Submarine 
Capability Life Extension and Tank Replacement Project have similarly reached FOC, but are 
included in this list because the projects have not yet been fully completed. 
In their totality, these individual project descriptions do reveal that every single one of the 
projects examined have experienced a delay in achieving at least one milestone. None of the 
projects that had a single FOC date achieved that milestone on schedule, although the Halifax 
Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension, Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade (LAV III 
UP), and Protected Military Satellite Capability projects remain on track to do so, and the 
Mercury Global project is slated to achieve this milestone a year early. 
Only the Submarine Capability Life Extension achieved IOC on schedule (and this schedule 
was set nine years after the vessels were acquired), while the Halifax Class Modernization/
Frigate Life Extension did so only one month behind schedule, and the Airlift Capability 
Project – Strategic, achieved this marker six months late. Multiple other projects that have 
yet to reach IOC are delayed by multiple years in doing, with the Joint Support Ship slated to 
achieve this milestone eight years later than originally intended. 
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Annex 1 Projects Listed in the 2015/2016 RPP:
1. Airlift Capability Project – Strategic 
2. Airlift Capability Project – Tactical
3. Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship 
4. Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program
5. Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Project
6. Canadian Surface Combatant Project 
7. Future Fighter Capability 
8. Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement 
9. Force Mobility Enhancement 
10. Halifax Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension
11. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
12. Joint Support Ship 
13. Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System 
14. Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project
15. Lightweight Towed Howitzer
16. Maritime Helicopter Project 
17. Medium Support Vehicle System Project 
18. Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter 
19. Mercury Global 
20. Protected Military Satellite Communications 
21. Submarine Capability Life Extension 
22. Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle 
23. Tank Replacement Project 
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Airlift Capability Project – Strategic
Project Budget: $1.8 billion
Project Description: 
This project originated as a Conservative Party of Canada campaign promise in the 2006 
election to acquire “a fleet of at least three strategic lift aircraft.”46 That scope was subsequently 
expanded to acquiring four aircraft. All aircraft were delivered by 2008 and this initial project 
was closed out after it hit FOC in 2012. The Government of Canada announced it would 
acquire a 5th C-17 on December 19, 2014 using the remaining funding from the acquisition 
budget of the original aircraft purchase which was completed roughly $415 million under 
budget.47 
Explanation of Variance: 
Delivery of the first four aircraft occurred very quickly, as Canada used the Advance Contract 
Award Notice (ACAN) process, a procedure used to advertise an intent to sole source a 
purchase, to procure the C-17 specifically. Canada also bought a virtually unmodified 
aircraft off an existing American production line, with the concurrence of the United 
States Government, at a time when Canada had a need for airlift because of operations 
in Afghanistan. The project was also a personal priority of the new Minister of National 
Defence, Gordon O’Connor, and benefitted from the strong working relationship between 
Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and Deputy Minister Ward Elcock.48 The In-
Service Support (the activities required to sustain the operation of a military fleet over its 
lifetime) arrangements secured for the fleet tapped into the existing world-wide arrangements 
established for American C-17 fleet, facilitating a rapid acquisition. 
Despite the speed of implementation, FOC of the original four aircraft was delayed due to 
complexities associated with transitioning to the In-Service Support arrangements, which 
required the full availability of infrastructure at Canadian Forces Base Trenton.49
The extremely rapid acquisition of the 5th aircraft is attributable to similar dynamics. Boeing 
had built 10 additional C-17s, “white tailed”50 in that they had no identified customer in mind. 
Canada therefore purchased an existing aircraft, already produced, without any modifications.
46 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives call for boost to Canadian Forces,” December 19, 2005.
47 Canada, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Increased Air Power for the Royal 
Canadian Air Force - Fifth CC-177 Globemaster to Increase RCAF Airlift Capability,” December 19, 2014  
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=916009, DPR 2013/2014
48 Rick Hillier, A Soldier First Toronto: Harper Collins, 2008.
49 RPP 2010-2011
50 
Nigel Pittaway “Boeing: Five C-17As Still for Sale ,” Defence News, April 23, 2015 http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/
air-space/support/2015/04/23/australia-c17-boeing-air-force-globemaster/26137493/ 
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Major Milestones: Initial51 201452 Most Recent53
Memorandum to Cabinet  June 2006  
Effective Project Approval  June 2006  
ACAN Notice  July 2006  
Contract Award  Feb, 2007 
First Delivery Aug 2007  
Last Delivery  Apr 2008  54 
IOC  Spr 2008 Oct 2008 
FOC  Sum 2009  Dec 2012 
-----------The Initial Project Closed After Reaching FOC for the First 4 Aircraft-----------
Amended Project Approval for 5th Aircraft Dec 2014 
IOC 5th Aircraft Apr 2015
FOC 5th Aircraft Aug 2015
Project Close Out Dec 2015
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
The Government of Canada announced it would acquire a 5th C-17 on December 19, 2014. It 
was delivered to Canadian Forces Base Trenton on March 30, 2015.55 
51 The footnotes in each header category indicate that the information contained in the column is from that source unless 
otherwise specified. In the interest of brevity, many of the citations employ an abbreviation. RPP indicates that the reference 
is from the Department of National Defence Report on Plans and Priorities for the indicated Fiscal Year. DPR indicates that 
the reference is from the Department of National Defence Departmental Performance Report from the indicated Fiscal Year. 
Information in this column is from Department of National Defence Departmental Performance Report 2006/2007, (Ottawa: 
2006) or DPR 2006/2007.
52 RPP 2014/2015
53 
RPP 2015/2016
54 David Pugliese, “Fourth C-17 Delivered to Canadian Air Force,” Ottawa Citizen, April 4, 2008. http://ottawacitizen.com/news/
national/defence-watch/fourth-c-17-delivered-to-canadian-air-force
55 David Pugliese, “New RCAF Globemaster lands in Canada,” Ottawa Citizen, March 31 2015 http://ottawacitizen.com/news/
national/defence-watch/new-rcaf-globemaster-lands-in-canada
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Airlift Capability Project – Tactical
Project Budget: $3.2 billion
Project Description: 
This project replaced the oldest members of the RCAF’s fleet of C-130 Hercules aircraft. A 
commitment to do so first appeared in the 2005 Budget, and it was reiterated in the 2005 
Defence Policy Statement. It was first brought forward for Cabinet approval in the fall of 2005 
as a sole source procurement for the C-130J, but this strategy was rejected.56 
This project was named as part of the Conservative Party of Canada’s 2006 election platform, 
which committed to the “replacement of Canada’s tactical airlift fleet of C-130 Hercules 
aircraft”57 The project entered the Implementation stage with the December 2007 contract 
award to Lockheed Martin Corporation for 17 C-130J aircraft. Aircraft deliveries began in May 
2010 and were completed by May 2012. The contract was subsequently amended in December 
2009 to include provisions for In-Service Support, in February 2010 for maintenance training 
systems, and in November 2013 for the Block 7 avionics modification required to satisfy final 
Project Deliverables.58  
Explanation of Variance: 
The project was initially delayed due to the transition in government after the 2006 election. 
Thereafter it had to be reconciled with their Harper Government’s prioritized acquisition of a 
strategic airlift aircraft. Once the decision was made to proceed with the purchase, it occurred 
rapidly, in part because the C-130J was determined to be the only qualified aircraft following 
the Solicitation of Interest and Qualification, a procedure by where potential bidders are 
invited to indicate if they are interested and capable of bidding on a procurement. There was 
also a clear operational need due to the advanced age of the fleet being replaced, and pressing 
operational demand due to operations in Afghanistan. 59 
Delays in achieving IOC, FOC and Project Close Out appear to be due to longer than expected 
timelines for establishing contracts for In-Service Support, maintainer training and upgrading 
infrastructure at CFB Trenton.60
56 Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement, Kingston: Breakout Education Network, 2006, 30.
57 
Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives call for boost to Canadian Forces,” December 19, 2005.
58 
RPP 2015/2016 
59 Hiller, A Solider First. 
60 DPR 2012/2013
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Major Milestones: Initial61 201462 Most Recent63
Memorandum to Cabinet  June 2006 
Preliminary Project Approval June 2006 
Effective Project Approval  Fall 2007 Dec 2007 
Contract Award  Fall 2007 Dec 2007 
First Delivery  Aug 2010 June 2010 
IOC  Sum 2011 Sep 2013 
FOC  Sum 2013 Fall 2016 Sep 2016
Project Close Out  Win 2014 Win 2016/17 Dec 2016
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
61 
DPR2006/2007
62 
RPP 2015/2016
63 
RPP 2015/2016
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Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship
Project Budget: $3.1 billion (original) - $3.5 billion (revised)
Project Description: 
This project evolved from the 2006 Conservative Party of Canada election platform 
commitment to “Station three new armed naval heavy icebreakers in the area of Iqaluit.”64 Over 
time this requirement was adapted significantly, and now calls for “an ice-capable ship”65 that 
will be able to operate year-round in one meter of first-year ice with old ice inclusions, while 
also being able to operate in the open ocean. The ship will be fitted with a gun system suited 
for constabulary roles, maintain a speed of 17 knots, operate at a range of 6,800 nautical miles, 
operate autonomously for up to four months, and embark utility helicopters and provide limited 
support to the CH-148 Cyclone discussed below.
The project originally intended to acquire six to eight vessels, but this changed following a 
review of the design. The current contract for five to six ships required a project increase of 
roughly $300 million.
Explanation of Variance: 
The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project was delayed by the launch of the National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy in June 2010. This process required first competitively selecting 
the winning shipyards that would build the ship (announced October 19, 2011), and then 
negotiating Umbrella Agreements with the shipyards that lay out the terms for the overall 
program (completed in February, 2012). Irving Shipyards Inc., awarded the work, subsequently 
undertook a roughly $300 million shipyard upgrade which saw the construction of an entirely 
new shipbuilding facility.
The project has subsequently employed a “design–then-build” approach which has effectively 
front-loaded a number of activities into a larger than usual definition contract. This effort 
resulted in a more costly and longer than normal Definition stage designed to help gain a better 
understanding of the ship design prior to beginning construction in the Implementation stage, 
as well as validating the new shipyard equipment and processes. The Arctic Offshore Patrol 
Ship project is also being used to validate the systems and processes to be used for the entire 
combat work package, including the Canadian Surface Combatant discussed below.66 
64 Conservative Party of Canada, “Defending Sovereignty - Strengthening Canada’s Arctic Forces,” December 22, 2005.
65 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2015, last modified June 35, 2014  
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/index.page 
66 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS)” last modified July 14, 
2015 http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/sam-mps/nouvelles-news-eng.html 
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Major Milestones: Initial67 201468 Most Recent69
Memorandum to Cabinet  Jan 2008 
Preliminary Project Approval May 2007 
Revised Project Approval Definition 1  Oct 2011 
Revised Project Approval Definition 2  Dec 2012 
Definition Contract  Mar 2013 
Effective Project Approval Jan 2010 2014 
Contract Award (Implementation) Jan 2010 2015  
First Delivery  Aug 2013 2018 2018
IOC  Mar 2014 2019 2019
FOC  Sum 201370  2023 2023
Project Close Out  Win 201471  2024
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
In October 2014, Task six for the construction of a test production module was issued under the 
definition contract and work began June 18, 2015.72 On January 23, 2015, the build contract for 
Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship was awarded to Irving Shipbuilding Inc., for a minimum of five 
ships, and significant incentives for the contractor to deliver a sixth.73 Full construction started 
September 1, 2015.74 
67 DPR 07/08
68 RPP 2014/15
69 
RPP 2015/2016
70 
DPR 2006/2007 
71 
DPR 2006/2007 
72 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), June 18, 2015  
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/sam-mps/snacn-nsps-eng.html
73 Government of Canada, “Harper Government Awards Shipbuilding Contract That Supports Jobs Across Canada,” January 23, 
2015 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=924929&_ga=1.151610809.1247111679.1424449696
74 
Irving Shipbuilding Inc, “Irving Shipbuilding Begins Construction of First Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) for Canada,” 
September 1, 2015 http://www.irvingshipbuilding.com/BlogPage.aspx?id=609&blogid=315
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Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program
Project Budget: $246 million 
Project Description: 
The Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program will modernize the Government 
of Canada’s cryptographic equipment and infrastructure in order to safeguard classified 
information and maintain Canada’s ability to establish secure communications both nationally 
and internationally. The project includes the following sub-projects: Secure Voice / Telephone 
Re-key Infrastructure – (SV/TRI); Classified Security Management Infrastructure (CSMI); 
Secure Voice / Telephone Replacement (SV/TR); Combat Identification Replacement (CIR); 
Link Encryption Replacement (LER); Network Encryption Replacement (NER); Secure Radio 
Replacement (SRR)
Explanations of Variances:  
The CCMP is reported to be on budget. Schedule slippage is in part due to its interdependence 
with the American Cryptographic Modernization Initiative and the Key Management 
Infrastructure Program. Canada’s collaboration with the United States allows Canada to 
leverage American research and development and maintain interoperability with its allies, but 
as a result the Canadian project’s timeliness must align with the American initiative.75
75 
RPP 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial76 201477 Most Recent78
Preliminary Project Approval (omnibus) Mar 2005 
Preliminary Project Approval CSMI Nov 2006 
CSMI Phase 1 Complete 2009
Phase 1A Complete  2014 2015
Phase 1B Complete  Mar 2012 
CSMI Phase 2 Complete 2011
Phase 2 Definition - Mar 2013 
Phase 2A - 2017 2017
Phase 2B - 2019 2019
CSMI Phase 3 Complete 2016 2020 2020
SV/TR Complete Sep 2007 July 2012 
SV/TRI Complete Mar 2008 Sep 2009 
LER Phase 1 Complete 2010 2020 2020
LER Phase 2 Complete 2016 - 2020
NER Complete 2011  2018 2018
CIR Complete 2016 2018 2018
SRR Complete 2016 - 2020
Project Complete 2016 - TBD
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
76 RPP 2007/2008
77 RPP 2014/2015
78 
RPP 2015/2016
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Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Project
Project Budget: $740 million
Project Description:  
This project emerged as one half of the New Shipborne Aircraft project that was cancelled by 
the Chrétien Government in 1993, and subsequently split into two separate projects for Search 
and Rescue Helicopters and Maritime Helicopters. It replaced the CH-113 Labradors with a 
fleet of 15 new CH-149 Cormorant helicopters.79 
Explanation of Variances: 
Initial delay was the result of the Chrétien decision to cancel the original New Shipborne 
Aircraft project. Further delay then resulted from an initial, unchallenged, assumption that the 
requirement could be procured ‘Off the Shelf.’ In reality, an assessment found that the final 
aircraft delivered has less than 30 per cent commonality with the actual ‘Off the Shelf’ variant. 
This delayed the issuance of airworthiness certification, and contributed to an initial under-
resourcing of the Project Management Office.80 
Effective Project Closure was achieved on September 15, 2004, but work is ongoing to achieve 
Project Close Out. A three year Technical Publication Revision Service was required to 
progress towards FOC, which did not begin until 2007-2008.81 The remaining work required to 
achieve FOC is related to retrofits to incorporate design specifications that are completed when 
major maintenance is conducted on the fleet.82
79 Aaron Plamondon, The Politics of Procurement. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010.
80 Chief Review Services, Review of the Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter Acquisition (Cormorant) (Ottawa: Department 
of National Defence, 2007).
81 
DPR 2006/2007
82 
RPP 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial83 201484 Most Recent85
Preliminary Project Approval Nov 1995 
Request for Proposal Nov 1996 
Effective Project Approval  Apr 1998 
Contract Award  Apr 1998 
First Delivery  June 2000 Sep 2001 
Final Delivery July 200286 July 2003 
Project Completion (effective) July 200487 Sep 2004 
Project Close Out  Win 201488 2015 2015
Notable Progress since September 2014:  
No Information Publicly Available. 
83 
RPP 1998/1999, 88-89.
84 RPP 2014/2015
85 
RPP 2015/2016
86 
RPP 1999/2000, 33.
87 
RPP 1998/1999, 89.
88 
DPR 2006/2007
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Canadian Surface Combatant Project
Project Budget: $26 billion
Project Description: 
The Canadian Surface Combatant Project will recapitalize Canada’s naval fleet, through two 
variants: An Area Air Defence and Task Group Command and Control variant and a General 
Purpose variant. This was first discussed in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement which pledged 
to “Begin to define the requirements for a new class of surface ship to replace the current 
destroyers and frigates.”89 The project formed part of the 2006 Conservative Party of Canada 
election platform, which committed to “initiating a longer term frigate/destroyer replacement 
program,”90 and was included in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. The Project will 
begin with the acquisition of a replacement for Area Air Defence and Task Group Command 
and Control capabilities, forming the basis for the subsequent acquisition of general-purpose 
warships. The project was originally set to acquire 15 vessels, but this was later revised to 
“up to 15”91 vessels. Definition work began in June 2012, and has proceeded with a number 
of studies to inform the development of technical specifications.  At the same time, numerous 
industry engagements have been undertaken on a range of issues related to the procurement.
Explanation of Variance: 
The project is part of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, and progress on the 
Canadian Surface Combatant has been dependent upon progress on the other aspects of that 
wider strategy, detailed above. The project experienced significant delay in selecting the final 
procurement strategy for the project, which was originally supposed to occur in the summer 
of 2013. The use of 15 industry engagement sessions since 2012 is reflective of a commitment 
to engaging with industry, but at the same time contributed to a delay in announcing a “Most 
Competitive Procurement Strategy” in May 2015. Delaying this announcement in turn delayed 
the initiation of the selection process for the Combat Systems Integrator and Warship Designer. 
As a result, there now appears to be a gap of almost two years between the completion of 
the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project and the start of Canadian Surface Combatant Project 
construction.
Government of Canada capacity on all aspects of shipbuilding remains a key difficulty. To 
mitigate this lack of capacity, Canada is relying heavily on contracted third party services, 
which requires significant effort to obtain. In July 2015, for instance, Public Works and 
Government Services Canada issued a Request for Proposals for “contract negotiation 
expertise, advice and related training services”92 worth up to $5 million. 
89 Department of National Defence, Defence Policy Statement. (Ottawa: 2005), 14. All subsequent references to the Defence 
Policy Statement refer to this document. 
90 Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives will boost defence on West Coast to protect Canadian sovereignty,” December 
27, 2015.
91 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Secretariat,” July 14, 2015  
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/sam-mps/snacn-nsps-eng.html 
92 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “3RD PARTY EXPERT NEGOTIATION ADVICE (EN578-160489/A)” July 
2, 2015 https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-XLV-577-6772
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Major Milestones: Initial93 201494 Most recent95
Identification Phase Approval July 200796 
Preliminary Project Approval 2011
Definition Phase 1  June 2012 
Definition Phase 2  2016 2016
Definition Contract  2016 2016
Effective Project Approval  2018 2020
Implementation Contract Award 2015 2018 2020
First Delivery  2025 2025
IOC 2021 2026 2026
FOC 2036 2042 2042
Project Close Out 203797 2043 2043
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
In January 2015, the Government of Canada announced that Irving Shipbuilding Inc. would 
be the prime contractor for the project.98 On May 1, 2015 the “Most Competitive Procurement 
Strategy” for the Canadian Surface Combatant Project was announced and the selection 
process for the projects Combat Systems Integrator and Warship Designer was launched.99 Over 
the summer of 2015 an initial cost and capability reconciliation process was initiated as part of 
the project’s Definition stage.
93 RPP 2011/2012
94 RPP 2014/2015
95 
RPP 2015/2016
96 DPR 2010/2011
97 RPP 13/14
98 
James Cudmore, “Irving named prime contractor for Canadian surface combatant warships,” CBCNews.ca January 20, 2015 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/irving-named-prime-contractor-for-canadian-surface-combatant-warships-1.2920071 
99 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Secretariat,”
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Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft
Project Budget: Original $1.3 billion, Revised, $1.55 billion, currently a firm budget is not 
established.100
Project Description: 
This project will replace the fixed wing component of the RCAF’s search and rescue fleet. In 
2004, the Martin government provided money in its budget to accelerate the replacement of 
search and rescue airplanes, it was mentioned specifically in 2005 Defence Policy Statement, 
and was first brought forward for Cabinet approval in the fall of 2005, but not approved.101 The 
project also appeared in the 2006 Conservative Party campaign platform, and was specifically 
mentioned in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy.
Explanation of Variance: 
An internal DND audit of the project noted initial delay following the 2004 budget related to a 
lack of external endorsement of the project’s procurement strategy, problems with the project’s 
life cycle costing, as well as issue with its proposal for In-Service Support. 102 Alan Williams 
described the former problem as related to the RCAF’s Statement of Operational Requirement, 
which he contends was written by the RCAF to favour the Alenia C27J.103
The issue lingered for several years, until the National Research Council was asked by Public 
Works and Government Services Canada to review the project’s requirements in 2009. It 
reported in March 2010 that “The [Statement of Operational Requirement] as written is over-
constrained.”104 A revised document was finalized in December 2010, and a Public Works 
and Government Services Canada led secretariat was established to provide governance for 
the project in February 2012. Changes to the final Request for Proposals were also created 
by introducing a requirement for a Canadian In-Service Support Integrator to maximize 
the industrial benefits accruing to Canadian industry from the project’s In-Service Support 
arrangements.105 
100 
According to Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Details of the final estimates will only be known when bids 
have been received and the successful bid is presented to the Government.” Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
“Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement (FWSAR) Project: Frequently Asked Questions - Q7. What is the budget 
for the FWSAR project?” September 11, 2015, Accessed October 17, 2015. http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-
lamsmp/faq-eng.html
101 Williams, Reinventing Defence Procurement
102 
Chief Review Services, “Audit of the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Project (FWSAR),”(Ottawa: Department of National 
Defence, May 2009)
103 Williams, Reinventing Defence Procurement, 40.
104 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Review of the Statement of Operational Requirement for the Fixed 
Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft,” March 12, 2010 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs/fixed-wing-search-rescue-
aircraft-2010.page 
105 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement (FWSAR) Project: 
FWSAR Project - Independent Review of Evaluation Plans, Methods and Tools” April 2, 2015, Accessed October 17, 2015. 
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/svtvnpro-rscfwpro-eng.html
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Major Milestones: Initial 2014106 Most Recent107
DND Identification stage approval Nov 2002 
Preliminary Project Approval Spr/Sum 2009108 Mar 2012 
RFP Released Mar 2005109 - Mar 2015
Effective Project Approval  Spr 2010110 Win 2014/15 2016
Contract Award  Spr/Sum 2010111 Win 2014/15 2016
First Delivery  Mar- Sep 2005112 Win 2017/18 2019
IOC 2018113 2018 2020
FOC 2019114 2020 2022
Project Close Out Spr/Sum, 2017115 2020 2023
Significant Progress since September 2014: 
On March 31, 2015 the Request for Proposal for the project was released. Bids were originally 
to be submitted by September 28, 2015, but the bid closing date was extended to January 11, 
2016 at the request of bidders. This request was the result of a highly complicated, multi-
thousand page Request for Proposal.116
106 RPP 2014/2015
107 
RPP 2015/2016
108 
RPP 2009/2010
109 RPP 04/05, p. 27.
110 
RPP 2009/2010
111 
RPP 2009/2010
112 Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Plan 2004 (Ottawa: 2004), 194.
113 DPR 2011/2012
114 DPR 2011/2012
115 
RPP 2009/2010
116 David Pugliese, “Fixed Wing Search and Rescue project faces another delay,” Ottawa Citizen, September 24, 2015  
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/fixed-wing-search-and-rescue-project-faces-another-delay
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Force Mobility Enhancement
Project Budget: $376 million
Project Description: 
The Force Mobility Enhancement project is a two-phase project. In Phase 1, the project will 
replace Canada’s aging Leopard 1 Armoured Engineer Vehicle Badger fleet with a heavily 
protected and mobile platform capable of supporting the newly acquired Leopard 2 Main 
Battle Tank until 2035. The project will then acquire 13 Leopard 2-based Armoured Engineer 
Vehicles, with an option of an additional five, including engineering implements for the 
Armoured Engineer Vehicle. In Phase 2, the project will acquire tactical mobility implements 
for the in-service Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank. Tactical mobility implements could include, 
but are not limited to, mine rollers, mine ploughs, and dozer blades. The project will also seek 
to acquire two Leopard 2-based Armoured Recovery Vehicles, with an option of an additional 
two, as support variants for the Armoured Engineer Vehicle. The Armoured Recovery Vehicles 
will be acquired by exercising contract options from the Tank Replacement Project.
Explanations of Variances:  
On 10 December 2013, the contractor informed DND that IOC would be postponed for seven 
months from February 2015 to September 2015 due to delays in the design and delivery of the 
casted chassis modules. On August 26, 2014, DND was notified of a second delay and IOC is 
now expected in October 2016. This second is due to the postponement of ballistic testing by 
eight months.117
117 
RPP 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial118 2014119 Most Recent120
Identification Phase Approval Aug 2008121 Sep 2008 
Preliminary Project Approval June 2009122 
Revised Preliminary Project Mar 2011123 Oct 2011124 Mar 2012125 
Approval Phase 1
RFP Phase 1 Oct 2010 
RFP Phase 2 June 2011 
Effective Project Approval  Apr 2014126 
Effective Project Approval Phase 1  Mar 2012 
Effective Project Approval Phase 2 Feb 2012 Nov 2013 
Contract Award Phase 1 Nov 2011 Apr 2012 
Contract Award Phase 2 Mar 2012 Dec 2013 
IOC Phase 1 Apr 2014 Feb 2015 Oct 2016
IOC Phase 2 Dec 2013 Aug 2015 Aug 2015
FOC 2015127 Dec 2016 Dec 2017
Project Close Out  2017128 2017 Mar 2018
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
118 DPR 2010/2011
119 RPP 2014/2015
120 
RPP 2015/2016
121 RPP 2010/2011
122 RPP 2010/2011
123 RPP 2010/2011
124 DPR 2010/2011
125 RPP 2012/2013
126 RPP 2010/2011
127 RPP 2010/2011
128 RPP 2010/2011
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Future Fighter Capability Project
Project Budget: $9 billion
Project Description: 
The objective of the Future Fighter Capability Project is to replace the CF-18 fleet upon its 
retirement. Canada initially joined the Concept Demonstration Phase of the Joint Strike Fighter 
Consortium in 1997, and subsequent phases of the project in 2002 and 2006. The 2008 Canada 
First Defence Strategy committed to purchasing “starting in 2017, 65 next-generation fighter 
aircraft to replace the existing fleet of CF-18s.”129 In June 2010 the Government of Canada 
announced that Canada would purchase the Joint Strike Fighter.130 
Explanation of Variance: 
In March 2011, the Parliamentary Budget Officer released a report indicating that the cost 
of acquiring the aircraft exceeded those released publically and in April 2012, a report from 
the Auditor General of Canada similarly presented a higher cost estimate and also indicated 
several problems with the process used to decide to purchase the F-35. On April 3, 2012, the 
Government of Canada announced a comprehensive response to Auditor General’s report, 
including a Seven-Point Plan to address the Auditor General’s recommendation. As a result, the 
National Fighter Procurement Secretariat was established to provide oversight and coordination 
amongst the departments involved with the implementation of the Seven-Point Plan, and the 
procurement was reset. 
The RCAF has completed the evaluation of options, which has been reviewed by an 
Independent Review Panel, and all the associated work was completed in December 2014. 
While much of the supporting work that went into this process was made public, the 
conclusions of the review were not. It was reportedly presented to Government in the spring of 
2014.131 At present, Canada remains in the Joint Strike Fighter Program to keep the F-35 option 
open and to provide companies in Canada the opportunity to compete for contracts on the 
F-35 aircraft.132 During the 2015 federal election, however, the Liberal Party of Canada stated 
that “We will not buy the F-35,” and instead “immediately launch an open and transparent 
competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft.”133 The Minister of National Defence’s 
Mandate Letter instructs him to “launch an open and transparent competition to replace the 
CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on options that match Canada’s defence needs.”134 
129 Department of National Defence. Canada First Defence Strategy. 17.
130 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 2—Replacing 
Canada’s Fighter Jets (Ottawa: Spring 2012)
131 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS),” December 10, 2015 http://
www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/snac-nfps-eng.html 
132 
RPP 2015/2016
133 Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (Ottawa: 2015), 70.
134 Prime Minister of Canada, Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter (Ottawa: 2015) 
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Major Milestones: Initial135 2014136 Most Recent137
Identification Phase Approval Jan 2010 
First Procurement Request Jan 2012
First Delivery Dec 2016
IOC May 2020
FOC Sep 2025
Project Close Out  Dec 2027
-------------In April 2012, a Complete Review of the Project was Announced-------------
Preliminary Project Approval 2015/2017 2015-2017
Effective Project Approval 2018/2020 2018-2020
Contract Award 2018/2020 2017-2019
First Delivery TBD TBD
IOC TBD TBD
FOC TBD TBD
Project Close Out TBD TBD
Progress since September 2014: 
None
135 DPR 2010/2011
136 DPR 2013/2014
137 
RPP 2015/2016
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Halifax Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension
Project Budget: $4.3 billion
Project Description: 
This project is both modernizing and life extending all 12 Halifax class frigates, commissioned 
between 1992 and 1996. It began as a life extension only (FELEX in the proceeding page), but 
this was combined in 2005 to include a number of capability upgrades (HCM/FELEX). This 
was pledged in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement138 and mentioned in the 2006 Conservative 
Party Platform.139 The ships were originally designed for anti-submarine warfare and anti-
surface warfare, in the open ocean environment, while the operational activities of the fleet 
have shifted increasingly to littoral regions. The project is providing enhancements to both 
sensors and weapons as well as life extending critical equipment. This includes: A new 
Combat Management System; radar suite; Interrogator Friend or Foe Mode S/5; internal 
communications system upgrade; harpoon Missile system upgrade; electronic warfare 
system upgrade; Long-range Infrared Search and Track system; modification to the gun; and 
replacement of the Shield II missile decoy countermeasures system, integrated machinery 
control system, and navigation radars.140 A limited capability to embark a Task Group 
commander has been added to four of the ships as well.141
Explanation of Variance: 
The project is extremely complex, involving major changes the ships systems, with work 
occurring in two separate shipyards, with a separate contract for the Combat Systems 
Integration, Internal Communications System, and Weapons Control System. The project 
was led by an innovative management arrangement which created a Committee on Sponsors 
including the Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel, the Commander, RCN, the Assistant Deputy 
Minister Acquisitions from Public Works and Government Services Canada, as well as the 
Chief Executive Officers from each of the principal contractors to establish collaborative 
working relations from the beginning of the project.142 This arrangement was crucial to 
resolving schedule issues and controlling costs, and was facilitated by continuity in key staff 
positions.143 
138 Department of National Defence, Defence Policy Statement, 14.
139 Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives will boost defence on West Coast to protect Canadian sovereignty,” December 
27, 2015.
140 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Halifax-Class Modernization (HCM) / Frigate Life Extension (FELEX),” 
November 24, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=halifax-class-modernization-hcm-frigate-life-extension-
felex/hkm9beb0 
141 
RPP 2015/2016
142 Chief Review Services. Audit of the Halifax-Class Modernization / Frigate Life Extension (HCM/FELEX) Project. (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence , 2011)
143 Doug Dempster, “Navigating Complexity,” Vanguard, September/October 2015.
37
2015 Status Report on Major Defence Equipment Procurements
Major Milestones: Initial144 2014145 Actual146
Preliminary Project Approval (FELEX) Feb 2005 
Preliminary Project Approval (HCM/FELEX) Feb 2007 
Effective Project Approval  Apr, 2008 Sep 2008 
Multi-Ship Contract Awards Oct 2007 Mar 2008 
Combat System Integration Contract Sep, 2008 Nov 2008 
Refits Start  Apr 2010 Oct 2010 
IOC  Jan 2015 Feb 2015147
FOC Jan 2018148 Jan 2018 Jan 2018
Project Close Out  Apr 2018 Jan 2019 Jan 2019
Progress Since September 2014: 
The first modernized frigates were delivered in late 2014 and the first upgraded frigate 
deployment occurred when HMCS Fredericton participated in Operation Reassurance from 
January to July 2015. It was replaced by HMCS Winnipeg, the second modernized frigate to 
deploy operationally.149 The final Halifax class frigates are currently in refit. 
144 
DPR 2006/2007
145 RPP 2014/15
146 
RPP 2015/2016
147 RCN Subject Matter Expert, Email to the Author, November 2015
148 
RPP 2009/2010
149 Government of Canada, “HMCS Winnipeg replaces HMCS Fredericton in support of NATO-led maritime assurance activities,” 
July 7, 2015 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=996859&tp=1 
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Intelligence Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
Project Budget: N/A
Project Description:  
This project is providing an integrated, interoperable, Intelligence Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance capability that will improve the ability of commanders to 
visualize the operational area, manage sensors and information collection resources, and to 
plan and implement actions to successfully complete operational missions. It will enhance 
existing capabilities and acquire new ones in the areas of communications, command and 
control and sensors. The project includes the acquisition of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 
Weapon Locating Sensors (WLS) and transformation or enhancement of existing sensor 
platforms to include Electronic Warfare (EW). In support of Operation Athena in 2003/2004 
timeframe, the project delivered equipment in the areas of Command and Control, Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (TUAV), Weapons Locating Sensors and Electronic Warfare 
capabilities as ‘Unforecasted Operational Requirements.’ Early deliveries of elements of the 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Electronic Warfare and Data Link Communications sub-projects 
continued during 2006 for Operation Archer. As well, urgently required systems, in particular 
the Acoustic Weapons Locating System, the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar system, and 
additional Electronic Warfare systems were fielded in 2007.
Explanations of Variances:  
Initial deliveries were estimated to occur in 2005–2006, but the Unforecasted Operational 
Requirement for an UAV and other sensor upgrades resulted in the delivery of a partial tactical 
UAV and Electronic Warfare capability in Afghanistan in 2003–2004. The implementation 
of the other sub-projects was delayed as the project team delivered numerous other aspects of 
the projects that were also Unforecasted Operational Requirements to Afghanistan.150 Current 
estimates are that the project will be completed in 2018. This delay is associated with the 
U.S. Government Contracting delays for equipment acquired through Foreign Military Sales 
and by other delays incurred in deliveries.151 The project benefited from the ability to make 
maximum use of its project management resources and reallocate project staff towards urgent 
requirements quickly as well as project management continuity. 152
150 RPP 2014/2015
151 
RPP 2015/2016
152 Doug Dempster, “Navigating Complexity,” Vanguard, September/October 2015
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Major Milestones: Initial153 2014154 Most Recent155
Preliminary Project Approval April 3, 2003 
TUAV Unforecasted Operational Requirement (UOR)
Minister of National Defence Approval  May 2003 
FOC  Dec 2005 
Emergency Beyond Line of Sight Communication
Effective Project Approval  Nov 2005 
FOC  Mar 2010 
Communications & Data Link Component 
Effective Project Approval  Dec 2006 
FOC   Dec 2013 Dec 2014
Command and Control (C2)
Effective Project Approval  Feb 2008 
FOC  Jan 2014 Nov 2015
Early Warning (EW) Sensors
Effective Project Approval  Nov 2005 
FOC  Jan 2014 Jun 2015
In-Service Sensors Enhancement 
Effective Project Approval  Jan 2012 
FOC  Dec 2014 Mar 2016
Weapon Locating Sensors (WLS) Acoustic Sensor 
Effective Project Approval  Nov 2005 
FOC  Apr 2010 
Family of UAV 
Effective Project Approval – UOR  Nov 2005 
FOC  June 2015 Mar 2016
Light Weight Counter Mortar Radar 
153 
DPR2006/2007
154 RPP 2014/2015
155 
RPP 2015/2016
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Effective Project Approval  Mar 2007 
FOC  Dec 2014 Dec 2015
Medium Range Radar
Effective Project Approval  Jan 2012 
IOC  Jan 2014 Mar 2015
FOC  Dec 2015 Mar 2016
Deliveries on All Sub-projects 2012  Dec 2015 May 2018
Project Close Out  Mar 2013 Dec 2016 Sep 2018
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
The Medium Range Radar contract was awarded to Rheinmetall Canada Inc. on July 27, 
2015.156 
156 Government of Canada, “Government of Canada Awards Contracts for Leading-edge Technology to Support Our Troops,” July 
27, 2015. http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1007209
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Joint Support Ship
Project Budget: $2.6 billion
Project Description: 
This project is replacing the RCN’s Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessels. It was first 
discussed in the 1994 White Paper,157 and the Liberal Party of Canada committed to purchase 
the vessels in their 2004 campaign, as did the Conservative Party of Canada in 2006.158 Early 
iterations of the project envisioned a vessel that would replace the existing capability and 
provide significant additional joint capabilities in the form of command and control, sealift 
and medical facilities. In August 2008, the project was cancelled when both submitted bids 
were “significantly over the established budget provisions.”159 The failure of this project 
and one for the Canadian Coast Guard, spurred the establishment of National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy, which was launched June 3, 2010.160 A revised project received Treasury 
Board Preliminary Project Approval a week later.  The project will see the ships based on 
an adaptation of the German Navy’s Berlin Class, and will not provide significant joint 
capabilities.
Progress Report and Explanations of Variances:  
The initial delay in acquiring this project was attributable to a shortage of capital funds in the 
1990s. Subsequently the first iteration of the project failed due to a significant deterioration 
of the Government of Canada’s knowledge of the Canadian shipbuilding industry, and the 
industry’s condition by the mid-2000s. As with the other aspects of National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy, this project was delayed by the overall National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy. The Joint Support Ship project will be the third class of ship built at 
the Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards, following three Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels and 
then an Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel for the Canadian Coast Guard. An agreement 
in principle for the construction of the first class was only reached and first steel cut in June 
2015. Their production will take until 2017, to be followed by the second class, and only then 
will work start on the Joint Support Ship. While work is progressing on the vessels Initial 
Design Review, the project is impacted both by delays associated with the earlier projects that 
proceed it, and the resource intensive efforts to make progress on those same projects by both 
the shipyard and Canada.161 On June 23, 2015 the Government of Canada announced that it 
was pursuing an Interim Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment capability to be used until the Joint 
Support Ship is delivered. 
157 Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper. (Ottawa: 1994).  
http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/downloads/1994%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defence.pdf
158 Conservative Party of Canada, “Conservatives will boost defence on West Coast to protect Canadian sovereignty,” December 
27, 2015.
159 
Government of Canada, “Archived - Bidders fail to meet budget requirements,” August 22, 2008  
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=tp&crtr.mnthndVl=&nid=416189
160 Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Secretariat,”
161 
Royal Canadian Navy, Joint Support Ship, last modified June 10, 2015  
http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/fleet-units/jss-home.page 
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Major Milestones: Initial162 2014163 Most Recent164
Memorandum to Cabinet Apr 2004 
Preliminary Project Approval Nov 2004 
Project Definition Contract Dec 2006 
Effective Project Approval  2008 
First Delivery  2012
IOC 2013 
FOC 2016
-----------------Project was canceled in 2008, and subsequently relaunched-----------------
Revised Preliminary project Approval June 2010165 
Effective Project Approval Feb 2013166 2016 2016 
Implementation Contract Mar 2013167 2016 2016 
IOC Spr 2018168 2019 2021169 
FOC Fall 2019170 2020 2020 
Project Close Out  2021 2020
Notable progress Since September 2014: 
On October 27, 2014 a contract was awarded for the production of initial modules for the 
Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels, the first class of ships to be built at Seaspan shipyards. 
This is the first step in testing the new shipyard processes implemented under the terms of the 
National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy agreement.171 On June 12, 2015 an agreement in 
principle was announced for the construction and delivery of three Offshore Fisheries Science 
Vessels.172 
162 
DPR 2006/2007
163 RPP 2014/2015
164 
RPP 2015/2016
165 
DPR 2009/2010
166 RPP 2011/2012
167 RPP 2011/2012
168 RPP 2011/2012
169 Government of Canada, “Government Announces Way Forward on Interim Supply Ship Capability,” June 23, 2015  
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=990619 
170 RPP 2011/2012
171 Government of Canada, “Harper Government Highlights New Milestone in Construction of First Canadian Ships,” October 27, 
2014 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=897269&crtr.tp1D=1 
172 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy” Technical Briefing on Offshore 
Fisheries Science Vessel,” June 12, 2015 http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/sam-mps/2015-06-12-eng.html 
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Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition
Project Budget: N/A
Project Description: 
The project was initially slated to procure and field a mature Medium Altitude Long Endurance 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system to provide capabilities for domestic and international 
operations. It was intended to complement existing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition capabilities, increase maritime and arctic domain awareness and provide a ground 
attack capability in support of Land and Special Operations Forces.173 The project now simply 
states that it will deliver a mature Long Endurance Unmanned Aircraft System capability 
that meets the objectives of the Canada First Defence Strategy for a robust domestic and 
international surveillance capability. This was mentioned in the 2006 Conservative Party of 
Canada platform, which committed to “Providing eastern and western Arctic air surveillance 
through stationing new long range uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) squadrons.”174
Explanation of Variance: 
The project has been in the Options Analysis stage since 2005. As a result of the limited market 
for unmanned aircraft that would satisfy all mandatory operational requirements in 2007, the 
project was delayed to enable a competitive procurement strategy, as a sole-source procurement 
was deemed unacceptable at the time by the contracting authority, resulting in a more than 
three year delay. In the meantime, the project office delivered a leased solution for operations 
in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2011, which delayed progress on the acquisition further. 
The project was again slowed down by changing capability requirements for speed, range, 
endurance, and intelligence functions.175
173 RPP 2011/2012
174 Conservative Party of Canada, “Stephen Harper stands up for Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic,” December 22, 2015.
175 
Chief Review Services, Internal Audit of Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) Project 
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, March 2014)
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Major Milestones: Initial176 2014177 Most Recent178
Preliminary Project Approval TBD 2016-2018 2017179
Effective Project Approval  TBD 2019-2020 2020180
Contract Award  TBD 2019-2020 2020181
First Delivery  TBD TBD 2021-25
IOC TBD TBD TBD
FOC TBD TBD TBD
Project Close Out  TBD TBD TBD
Significant Progress since 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
176 2011/2012
177 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2014 
178 
RPP 2015/2016
179 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2015
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
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Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project
Project Budget: $1.3 billion
Project Description:  
This project was part of the Family of Land Combat Vehicles Projects announced in the 2008 
Canada First Defence Strategy. The CAF’s experience in Afghanistan demonstrated the 
ongoing requirement for a highly protected, yet highly mobile Light Armoured Vehicle. The 
threats of mines, improvised explosive devises, explosively formed projectiles, and anti-armour 
weapons were deemed likely to be present in most medium to high threat missions. Despite 
improvements to the protection of the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III fleet deployed to 
Afghanistan, it had insufficient armour to defeat modern threats, and insufficient mobility 
given the increased weight of the vehicle due to the protection kits and the increased stowage 
of combat supplies. Further, the target acquisition and fire control systems require upgrading 
to overcome obsolescence issues and to improve lethality. Contract award was announced in 
October 2011, and in November 2012 contract amendment was announced exercising an option 
to upgrade 66 additional vehicles for a reconnaissance and surveillance capability.182
Explanation of Variance:  
First deliveries of the vehicles occurred in December 2012. Approximately 185 legacy LAV 
III have been inducted into production and 143 vehicles have been produced. The last public 
information indicates that 64 have been fielded to operational units.  Initial Operational 
Capability occurred in June 2014.183
182 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III Upgrade Project,” February 8, 2013 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=light-armoured-vehicle-lav-iii-upgrade-project/hie8w7nv 
183 
RPP 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial184 2014185 Most Recent186
Preliminary Project Approval June 2009 
Contract Approval Ear 2010 
Implementation Start Spr 2011 Oct 2011 
First Delivery  Late 2011187 End 2012 
IOC Fall 2013188 Spr 2014 
FOC 2018 2018 2018
Project completed  Spr 2019 Spr 2019 Mar 2019
Significant Progress since Sept 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available, but deliveries continue. 
184 RPP 2010/2011
185 RPP 2014/2015
186 
RPP 2015/2016
187 RPP 2010/2011
188 RPP 2013/2014
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Lightweight Towed Howitzer
Project Budget: NA
Project Description: 
The Lightweight Towed Howitzer will bridge a key facet of the Army’s current indirect fire 
capability deficiency.  It will field twenty-five M777 lightweight 155mm towed howitzers, each 
with a Digital Gun Management System (DGMS), supported by improved ammunition and 
a modern truck.  These howitzers will augment the 12 M777 howitzers currently in-service.  
These capability enhancements in terms of lethality, range, precision, mobility and digitization 
are needed to support future missions and tasks likely to be assigned to the Canadian Army. 
Explanation of Variance: 
Deliveries of the M777 howitzers and the Digital Gun Management System components started 
in 2010 and were completed in the summer of 2011. IOC was originally forecasted to occur 
in July 2011 and was shifted to October 2011 as a result of unforeseen issues with technical 
integration.  In October 2012, the project achieved full IOC. The M777 infrastructure initiative 
is currently in the construction phase.  The majority of infrastructure initiatives are expected to 
be completed by 2015-2016.
The project is planning to achieve Effective Project Closure in March 2018, a delay from the 
original date of June 2016.  This is due to the requirement to deliver infrastructure, the Medium 
Support Vehicle System gun tractor variant, ammunition components and the Ammunition 
Storage and Handling System before doing so.  The project had significant interdependencies 
with the Medium Support Vehicle System project, which has been much delayed. In 2014/2015, 
the project was also informed that delivery of the improved ammunitions was delayed to 
address improvements after completion of the evaluation trial, delaying systems integration 
work until the ammunition is delivered.189  
189 
RPP 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial190 2014191 Most Recent192
Preliminary Project Approval Jan 2008 
FMS Sales Agreement Nov 2008 
DGMS Contract Award Apr 2009 Nov 2009 
Effective Project Approval  June 2009 Jan 2010 
IOC Apr 2011 Oct 2011 Oct 2012
FOC Dec 2012 Mar 2016 Dec 2017
Project Close Out  June 2013 June 2016 Mar 2018
Significant Progress since 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
190 
RPP 2009/2010
191 RPP 2014/2015
192 
RPP 2015/2016
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Maritime Helicopter Project
Procurement Budget: $3.2 billion
Project Description: 
This project was originally begun in 1986 under the New Shipborne Aircraft Project to 
acquire a fleet of Maritime helicopters. The latest iteration, the Maritime Helicopter Project, 
is scheduled to replace the fleet of CH-124 Sea Kings with 28 new fully equipped Sikorsky 
Cyclone helicopters. The acquisition contract is bundled with a long-term in-service support 
contract and modify the modernized frigates discussed early to accommodate them.193 
Explanation of Variance: 
This project has been much delayed, beginning when the New Shipborne Aircraft Project 
was cancelled in 1993. When the project was re-launched, it was initially intended to award 
contracts separately for the Basic Vehicle and Integrated Mission System. The change in 
procurement strategy to letting a single contract for the Helicopter and its In-Service Support 
led to some early delay and was later abandoned.194 Since the Maritime Helicopter Project 
contract was signed in 2004, the project has experienced multiple further delays, largely related 
to the nature of the requirement. In 2008, after a request from the prime contractor, the contract 
was amended to allow for a delayed, tiered delivery schedule. This schedule was amended 
a second time in 2010. This was followed by a third party review and analysis of possible 
alternatives in 2013 to assess the feasibility of the project.195 While this was approved as an ‘Off 
the Shelf’ project, in reality it was not, as the helicopter that will ultimately be produced never 
existed before. This resulted in difficulties achieving the capabilities set out in the original 
contract, and required time consuming systems integration. Further, the incorrect assessment 
of the project’s developmental nature resulted in an inappropriate management framework and 
project schedule.196
In June 2014, another contract amendment was signed extending the In-Service Support 
arrangements to 2038 at the original rates, and revised the project schedule, allowing for eight 
initial capability Block 1 Aircraft to be delivered starting in June 2015. To date, 27 helicopters 
have completed initial build, and four of these have completed the Block 1 upgrade program.  
The initial build of the 28th helicopter is underway. The project is running within its authorized 
budget.197
193 Plamandon, The Politics of Procurement 
194 RPP 2001-2002
195 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Archived - Maritime Helicopter Project: Status (Fact Sheet),”June 19, 2014 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=index&crtr.page=1&nid=859129 
196 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Chapter 6: Acquisition of Military Helicopters. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 2010).
197 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Archived - Maritime Helicopter Project: Status (Fact Sheet)”
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Major Milestones: Initial 2014198 Most Recent199
Preliminary Project Approval June 2003 
Invitation for Bids Posted Dec 2003 
Effective Project Approval  Nov 2004 
------The Project Schedule Was Revised Following a Contract Amendment in 2014----
Amended Project Approval  June 2014 
Contract Award  Nov 2004 
First Delivery  Jan 2009
(Interim)  2015 
(Fully Capable)  2018 2018
Project Close Out  2013 2021 2022
Significant Progress since Sept 2014: 
On June 19, 2015 the first six, Block I Cyclones were accepted by the Government of Canada.200 
198 RPP 2014/2015
199 
RPP 2015/2016
200 
Canada, Department of National Defence, “Canada accepts six CH-148 Cyclone Helicopters,” June 19, 2015.  
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=989279 
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Medium Support Vehicle System Project
Project Budget: $1.1 billion
Project Description: 
On June 29, 2006 the Government of Canada announced that it would acquire medium sized 
logistics trucks as part of its Canada First Defence Strategy procurements. At the time of the 
announcement, this was articulated as the purchase of: 1500 vehicles designed for military 
use, up to 300 load-handling system companion trailers; 800 commercial vehicles adapted for 
military use; 1000 specially equipped vehicle kits, such as mobile kitchens, offices and medical 
or dental stations; and 300 armour protection systems.201 The Medium Support Vehicle System 
project was subsequently divided into five phases to reflect the aforementioned components, 
plus an additional fifth phase to provide for infrastructure. These are therefore: Phase 1: 
Militarized Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (MilCOTS); Phase 2 - Special Equipment Vehicle 
Baseline Shelters (Shelters); Phase 3 - Modification of the SEV Shelters (Kitting); and Phase 4 
- Standard Military Pattern (SMP) Trucks. Contracts were awarded for the Shelters and Milcots 
phases in 2009 and for the Kitting in 2012.202 
Explanation of Variance: 
While most components of this acquisition progressed without problems, the Standard Military 
Pattern vehicle experienced greater difficulty. An RFP was released in 2011, but was ultimately 
cancelled just before the deadline in 2012.203 Over the time since it was originally launched, 
project requirements had evolved in lieu of the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy and 
market factors had changed, as they had for a parallel Logistics Vehicle Modernization project 
which will also procure trucks for the army. Following a 2009 price and availability request 
to industry it was determined that additional funds were needed for the project, which were 
reallocated from the Logistics Vehicle Modernization project. While the total projects for each 
project combined remained unchanged, this financial reallocation was deemed to have not been 
properly communicated in official documentation. This was in part because of the introduction 
of the new reporting requirements related to the adoption of the Treasury Board’s Invest 
Planning Policy, described earlier. This led to the Request for Proposal’s cancellation, resulting 
in an 18 month project delay.204 
201 
Canada, National Defence, “Backgrounder: “Canada First” Defence Strategy Procurement, BG–06.014,” June 29, 2006.
202 
RPP 2015/2016
203 The Canadian Press, “Military truck purchase cancelled due to cost concerns,” July 11, 2012  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/military-truck-purchase-cancelled-due-to-cost-concerns-1.1273570 
204 Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services. Internal Audit of the Medium Support Vehicle System 
Project. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2014).
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Major Milestones: Initial205 2014206 Most Recent207
Preliminary Project Approval June 2006 
Effective Project Approval  June 2008 
Invitation for Bids Posted (Milcots) Aug 2007 Nov 2007 
Contract Award (Milcots) June 2008 Jan 2009 Jan 2009
First Delivery (Milcots) Mar 2009 June 2009 
Final Delivery (Milcots) Sep 2010 Oct 2012 Mar 2011
Invitation for Bids Posted (Shelters) Nov 2007 May 2008 
Contract Award (Shelters) June 2008 July 2009 
First Delivery (Shelters) July 2008 Apr 2012 May 2012
Final Delivery (Shelters) June 2010 2014 Feb 2015
Invitation for Bids Posted (Kitting)  Oct 2011 
Contract Award (Kitting) Dec 2012 
First Delivery (Kitting)  Fall 2013 Jan 2014 
Final Delivery (Kitting) TBD  2016 Fall 2016 
Invitation for Bids Posted (SMP) Oct 2007 July 2013 
Contract Award (SMP) Nov 2008 2015 Jun 2015
First Delivery (SMP) Aug 2009 2017 2017
Final Delivery (SMP) Aug 2011 2018 2018
IOC 2013 
FOC 2016
Project Close Out March 2010 2020 2020
Notable Progress Since September 2014:  
On July 16, 2015 the contract for SMP was awarded to Mack Defense.208
205 
DPR 2006/2007
206 RPP 2014/2015
207 
RPP 2015/2016
208 
Government of Canada, “Government of Canada Awards Major Military Procurement Contracts for New Trucks,” July 16, 2015 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1001579 
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Medium-To Heavy-Lift Helicopter
Project Budget: $2.3 billion
Project Description: 
The project has delivered 15 Chinook CH-147F and is establishing a new transport helicopter 
capability to support land-based domestic and international operations. The project includes the 
associated infrastructure and support elements to create a new helicopter unit based at Garrison 
Petawawa. It was included in the 2005 Budget, and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement. It was 
first brought forward for Cabinet approval in the fall of 2005, but not approved. It was therefore 
delayed awaiting approval by the new Harper Cabinet after the 2006 election.209 As originally 
conceived, the project was to delivery its first helicopter in 2008, but this did not occur until 
2013.210
Explanation of Variance: 
The delays in acquiring the helicopter resulted from the evolution of the requirements after 
2006, which were not finalized until a contract was signed in 2009. While the original 
requirements developed for the project could have been met by an existing model of the 
aircraft, the specifications actually provided to the contractor could not. They required 
significant changes to a basic helicopter model, requiring an additional two years to define 
the statement of work, and adding costs. This also impacted the timing and complexity of 
achieving certification for airworthiness.211
 All 15 aircraft have been delivered, the last being accepted in June 2014.  The most recent 
information, written in the fall of 2014, but not published until the spring of 2015, were 
that the project is progressively establishing the support systems and aircraft capabilities to 
enable the declaration of IOC in December 2014. A reduction in the size of the project office, 
commensurate with the work remaining, commenced in 2014 and will continue until project 
closure.212 
209 Hillier, A Soldier First
210 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Chapter 6: Acquisition of Military Helicopters. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 2010).
211 Ibid.
212 
RPP 2015/2016
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Major Milestones: Initial 2014213 Most Recent214
Preliminary Project Approval June 2006 
Advanced Contract Award Notice July 2006 
Effective Project Approval  Mar 2008 June 2009 
Contract Award  Mar 2008 June 2009 
First Delivery  Mar 2011 June 2013 
IOC Mar 2013 June 2014 Fall 2014
FOC Spr 2015 June 2017 June 2017
Project Close Out  Fall 2015 June 2018 June 2018
Significant Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
213 RPP 2014/2015
214 
RPP 2015/2016
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Mercury Global
Project Budget: N/A
Project Description:  
The project will provide wideband global satellite communications that are guaranteed and 
directly interoperable with our principal allies. The project will deliver a Canadian Wideband 
Global System Military Satellite Communications System for near-worldwide assured, 
wideband communications to the Canadian military for the command and control of deployed 
Canadian commanders and forces, as well as interoperability with some of our principal allies, 
the United States, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and New Zealand.
Progress Report and Explanations of Variances: 
In Phase 1, procurement of early access terminals and participation in the U.S. Department of 
Defense Wideband Global Satellite constellation was obtained through a 2012 Memorandum of 
Understanding for the construction and launch of the ninth Wideband Global System satellite. 
Effective Approval for Phase 2 was achieved in 2014 for the procurement and installation of 
the associated Wideband Global Satellite anchor station.  The Effective Project Approval date 
was changed after consultation with Public Works and Government Services Canada who 
advised that the project seek Project Approval and Contract Authority simultaneously. Effective 
Approval for Phase 3, the strategic deployable terminals, will be sought in 2016 after the 
Definition stage of that project is completed.215
Major Milestones: Initial216 2014217 Most recent218
Preliminary Project Approval  Oct 2011 
Initial Satellite Access Nov 2011 June 2012 
Effective Project Approval  Jan 2014 Apr 2014 Oct 2014
Terminal Implementation Complete Oct 2016 Oct 2016 Oct 2016
IOC   May 2013
FOC Oct 2017 Oct 2017 Oct 2016
Project Complete Win 2018 Win 2017-18 Jan 2017
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
The project is currently in use, supporting Operation Impact. In November 2014 contracts were 
awarded to General Dynamics Canada for both the design and build and in-service support of 
the anchor stations.219
215 
RPP 2015/2016
216 DPR 2011/2012
217 RPP 2014/2015
218 
RPP 2015/2016
219 Government of Canada, “Department of National Defence Awards Contracts for the Mercury Global Project,” November 12, 
2014 http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=903719 
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Protected Military Satellite Communications
Project Budget: $592 million 
Project Description: 
The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces require global communications 
that are secure, guaranteed and directly interoperable with our allies. The aim of the project is 
to overcome current Canadian interoperability and global command and control limitations. 
Upon completion, this project will enable long-range communications to deployed forces and 
facilitate their interoperability with allies.
Explanations of Variances: 
In Phase 1, procurement of guaranteed access to the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation was obtained through a Military Satellite 
Communications Memorandum of Understanding. Phase 2 has been underway since November 
2003, when Effective Project Approval for the procurement and installation of the satellite 
terminals was granted. The Canadian project has been delayed by delays to the American 
satellite launch schedule and the Victoria Class submarine installation.
Major Milestones: Initial220 2014221 Most Recent222
Preliminary Project Approval Aug 1999 
Effective Project Approval  Nov 2003 
Initial Terminal Delivery  Sum 2005 Nov 2011 
IOC Nov 2013223 Nov 2013 May 2013
FOC Fall 2017224 Dec 2020 Dec 2020
Project Complete  Sum 2009 Mar 2021 Mar 2021
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
220 RPP 2000/2001, 58.
221 RPP 2014/2015
222 
RPP 2015/2016
223 RPP 2014/2015
224 RPP 2011/2012
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Submarine Capability Life Extension
Project Budget: $877 million
Project Description: 
The Submarine Capability Life Extension project replaced the Oberon class submarine fleet 
with four existing British Upholder class (renamed Canadian Victoria class) submarines. 
The project will ensure that Canada preserves its submarine capability within the existing 
capital budget. The project supports Canada’s ability to conduct surveillance and control of its 
territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction, as well as Canada’s ability to participate 
in bilateral and multilateral operations.
The project delivered four functional Victoria class submarines with up-to-date, safe-to-dive 
certificates, four crew trainers (including a combat systems trainer, a ship control trainer, a 
machinery control trainer, and a torpedo handling and discharge trainer), and four trained 
crews.
Explanation of Variance: 
Although Effective Project Closeout is expected in 2015/216, a small number of engineering 
changes still require installation in HMCS Corner Brook during her upcoming deep 
maintenance phase, as well as the procurement of long-lead supply items.  
Major Milestones: Initial225 2014226 Most Recent227
Effective Project Approval June 1998 
Main Contract Award Jul 1998 
Initial Support Contract Award Jul 1998 
IOC Apr 2006228 
FOC Dec 2011229 2012 
Project Close Out Mar 2013230 2015  2017
Notable progress since September 2014: 
Three of the boats are now in the “operational” phase of their life cycle: HMCS Windsor, 
Victoria, and Chicoutimi.231
225 
RPP 1999/2000, 81.
226 RPP 2014/2015
227 
RPP 2015/2016
228 
RPP 2009/2010
229 
RPP 2009/2010
230 
RPP 2009/2010
231 
Royal Canadian Navy, “Victoria-class submarines reach operational steady state,” February 26, 2015. http://www.navy-marine.
forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=victoria-class-submarines-reach-operational-steady-state/i6miwqrg 
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Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle
Project Budget: $1.312 billion 
Project Description: 
The project will deliver to the Canadian Army a wheeled combat vehicle that will overcome 
deficiencies with the G-Wagon Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled, the RG-31 Armoured Patrol 
Vehicle, and the Coyote Light Armoured Vehicle related to capacity, protection, mobility, 
weapons effects, information and human dimensions. This vehicle will fulfill a wide variety 
of roles on the battlefield, including but not limited to surveillance, security, command and 
control, cargo and personnel carrier. It will have a high degree of tactical mobility and provide 
a very high degree of crew protection. The project scope includes an estimated initial purchase 
of 500 vehicles and an optional purchase of up to 100 more, plus associated long-term in-
service support.
Explanation of Variance: 
The project proceeded initially under an accelerated project schedule that compressed its 
Options Analysis stage by 10 months. As a result, the preliminary Statement of Operational 
Requirement, Concept Development and Experimentation and formal Price and Availability 
studies were delayed. Because of this, and the need to reengineer the available pre-existing 
vehicles to meet the requirement, the Definition stage was extended from 15 to 35 months.232 
Following the contract award in June 2012, six pre-production vehicles were received in July 
2013 for Qualification Testing at Canadian Forces Base Valcartier and at the United States 
Army Aberdeen Test Centre in Maryland. In August 2014 as part of this process, the first round 
of testing identified design problems.  The project returned to the contract design phase in order 
to allow the complex, inter-related designs for the vehicle’s structure, suspension and steering 
to be improved. Reliability testing resumed in the summer of 2015 and conclude by early 2016. 
Repeat engineering qualification testing will be conducted as necessary.233 
232 Chief Review Services. Internal Audit: Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV). (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 
2011).
233 
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Major Milestones: Initial234 2014235 Most Recent236
Identification Phase Approval Mar 2008 
Preliminary Project Approval June 2009 
Effective Project Approval Sum 2011 June 2012 
Contract Awarded Fall 2011 June 2012 
IOC 2013 2014 Mid-2016
FOC 2015 2016 Mid-2017
Project Complete 2017 2017 2017
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available, but since September 2014, the supplier has been engaged in 
a process of redesigning the vehicle. 
234 DPR 2010/2011
235 RPP 2014/2015
236 
RPP 2015/2016
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Tank Replacement Project
Project Budget: $650 million
Project Description: 
The purpose of the Tank Replacement Project is to replace Canada’s aging Leopard C2 
tank fleet with a modern, heavily protected, mobile, direct fire support capability. The Tank 
Replacement Project is broken into two phases. Phase 1 consists of the loan of 20 Leopard 2 
A6M Main Battle Tanks, two Armoured Recovery Vehicles and logistics support from the 
German Government for immediate deployment to Afghanistan, as well as the purchase of up 
to 100 surplus Leopard 2 tanks from the Netherlands Government. Phase 2 will upgrade and 
introduce up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks and variants into service.237
Progress Report and Explanations of Variances: 
Full FOC was changed from 2012 to an estimated date of February 2015 for several reasons. 
This includes the delivery of the Armoured Recovery Vehicles, schedule delay by Rheinmetall 
Canada (completed September 2014) and delivery of Phase 2 Initial Provisioning.  All 42 
Leopard 2A4 tanks and the first two Leopard 2 Armoured Recovery Vehicles have been 
delivered.  All 20 Leopard 2 A4M tank have been delivered to date, two of them remain at the 
contractor, KMW, one as the reference tank and one undergoing upgrade work.  The Leopard 
2 A6M fleet, consisting of 20 tanks, continues to undergo a major repair program following 
the combat mission in Afghanistan.  Currently, four Leopard 2A6Ms have completed repairs 
and have been returned to the Canadian Army.  The project intends to achieve effective project 
closure, not Project Close Out, during May 2015 due to ongoing deliveries beyond this time 
from of Armoured Recovery Vehicles, Sub-Caliber Training Device and Initial Provisioning 
items.238
237 
RPP 2015/2016
238 
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Major Milestones: Initial239 2014240 Most Recent241
Memorandum to Cabinet Mar 2007 
Preliminary Project Approval Mar 2007 
Phase 1 MOU for German Loaners May 2007 
Phase 1 contract to upgrade Loaners  May 2007 
Phase 1 IOC Aug 2007 
Phase 1 Acquisition of Dutch Tanks Dec 2007 
Effective Project Approval Mid 2009 
FOC Phase 2 2013+ Feb 2015 
Project Closed-Out  2013+ May 2015 May 2015
Notable Progress since September 2014: 
No Information Publicly Available. 
239 DPR 07/08
240 RPP 2014/2015
241 
RPP 2015/2016
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ANNEX 2: DEFENCE ACQUISITION GUIDE 2015
This section analyses the projects included in the Defence Acquisition Guide. This document 
was introduced as part of the Defence Procurement Strategy and is intended to “help Canadian 
industry position themselves to compete for potential future Canadian and international defence 
procurement opportunities.”242 Because the guide’s intent is to provide information about future 
equipment needs for the military, most of the initiatives listed have not yet received Preliminary 
Project Approval and are therefore been subject to change or removal.
The 2015 edition of the Defence Acquisition Guide comprised 6 categories: Land Systems; 
Naval Systems; Aerospace Systems; Joint and Other Systems; Services; and Canadian Special 
Operations Forces Command Services. The analysis here concentrates only on the first three 
categories, denoted as Army, RCN and RCAF in the tables below. The later categories were 
excluded because the projects in those lists did not facilitate meaningful comparisons of capital 
equipment acquisitions. The Special Operations Forces category was new in 2015. The Services 
category contained only services. Further, the Joint and Other Systems contained projects from 
12 different project sponsors within the CAF. Based on the initial analysis of the projects for 
the Army, RCN and RCAF, there were significant differences between the way each of those 
services (each a project sponsor) determined which projects to include in their entries in the 
document, and how precise they each were with respect to future milestone timelines. On that 
basis, the author determined that assessing the progress of the projects in the Joint and Other 
Systems category, proposed by 12 different sponsors, would not provide meaningful insights. 
Of note, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, Canadian Surface Combatant Project, Fixed Wing 
Search and Rescue Aircraft, Joint Support Ship, Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target 
Acquisition and Future Fighter Projects are listed in the 2014 and 2015 Defence Acquisition 
Guides as well as DND’s Status Report on Major Crown Projects. They therefore also appear 
in Annex 1. The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target 
Acquisition and Future Fighter Projects are On Time according to the metrics used in this 
Annex, which only compares progress year over year, even though their entries in Annex 1 
demonstrate that all three projects are delayed relative to their original schedules.
Table 1 compiled data on the 2014 and 2015 entries for the Army, RCN and RCAF. The 2015 
Defence Acquisition Guide entries that were new, had been archived, or had changed to absorb 
another project previously listed elsewhere on the 2014 edition of the document were excluded 
from this analysis. This excluded several Army projects that would otherwise by listed as 
‘Active’ below, on the grounds that the changes to these projects resulting from combining 
them with others would preclude a meaningful analysis of their progress from one year to the 
next.243 Projects that were new, or had been archived could not be compared from year to year. 
It should be noted that some of the entries on the 2014 document were archived because the 
242 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Acquisition Guide 2015, June 25, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/
en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/naval-systems.page, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Defence 
Acquisition Guide 2014, June 25, 2014 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide/joint-systems.page
243 
The following ‘active’ projects were not analyzed because they had been combined or significantly altered between 2014 and 
2015: Advanced Sub-Unit Water Purification System; Bridge and Gap Crossing Modernization; Camp Sustain; Common Heavy 
Equipment Replacement; and the Logistics Vehicle Modernization.
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projects advanced to the Implementation stage of their procurement. Canada signed onto the 
next phase of the Evolved Seasparrow Block 2, advancing the Point Missile Defence Upgrade 
project,244 a Request for Proposals for Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft was released in 
March 2015 and will close in January 2016,245 and Colt Canada will produce the New Canadian 
Ranger Rifle through the Munitions Supply Program, and was conducting testing this summer 
in the North.246 
For the remaining entries, the project milestones in the 2014 Defence Acquisition Guide were 
compared with those for the 2015 iteration of the document. If all the milestones were the same, 
the project was counted as “On Schedule.” If any of those milestones in the 2015 version were 
earlier than those in the 2014 Defence Acquisition Guide, the projects were counted as “Early,” 
whereas if any of the milestones were later, they were counted as “Late.”247 
Overall, 117 projects were compared: 58 for the Army; 21 for the RCN; and 38 for the RCAF. 
Of these, 7 (6 per cent of the total) were Early, 42 (36 per cent of the total) were On Schedule, 
and 68 (58 per cent of the total) were Late. The breakdowns by service show that the projects 
for the Army, RCN and RCAF are all roughly similar in terms of their relative progress. The 
primary difference amongst them is that the RCN had one more Early project than either of the 
other two, out of a much smaller total number of projects.
Recognizing that the Defence Acquisition Guide is intended to provide an early indication 
of what projects the CAF might pursue in the future, a second analysis was conducted of 
only those projects that each of the services judged to be “Active,” presented in Table 2. This 
restricted the analysis to those projects that actually had staff working on them, reducing the 
total number of projects examined to 59: 32 from the Army; 11 from the RCN; and 16 from 
the RCAF. Interestingly, the results of this analysis are almost exactly the same as those of the 
entire slate of projects: 3 per cent of the active projects are Early, 34 per cent are On Schedule 
and 63 per cent are Late.248 The full list of these projects is presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 below.
Of note, this analysis shows that three of the RCN projects advanced from one stage of 
the procurement process to the next. The Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project advanced 
from Definition to Contract Award and is now in Implementation, The Maritime Satellite 
Communications Upgrade received Effective Project Approval and the Naval Large Tug project 
moved into Options Analysis. Finally, although it occurred after the DAG was published, the 
Airspace Coordination Center Modernization, Royal Canadian Air Force Aerial Fire Fighting 
Vehicle, Search and Rescue Mission Management System Replacement and Underwater 
244 
Government of Canada, “Point Defence Missile System Upgrade: Evolved Seasparrow Missile Block 2,” December 19 2014. 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=916139
245 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft Replacement (FWSAR) Project,” 
September 11, 2015 http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/svtvn-rscfw-eng.html
246 
Jody Porter, “Canadian Rangers test new ‘top-tier weapon’” CBCnews.ca. July 10, 2015  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/canadian-rangers-test-new-top-tier-weapon-1.3143122
247 
One key difference between the 2014 DAG and the 2015 DAG is the latter provided more specific dates, rather than date ranges, 
for some projects. If the precise dates fell within a previous date range, it was counted to be On Schedule, if it fell earlier, Early, 
and later, Late.
248 This section and that in the Explanation of Variance, relied on interviews with Subject Matter Experts.
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Warfare Suite Upgrade projects received Preliminary Project Approval.249
TABLE 1 PROJECT SCHEDULE CHANGE FROM DAG 2014 - 2015
Service Total Faster On Schedule Slower
Army 58 2 3% 20 34% 36 62%
RCN 21 3 14% 7 33% 11 52%
RCAF 38 2 5% 15 39% 21 55%
Total 117 7 6% 42 36% 68 58%
TABLE 2 ACTIVE PROJECT SCHEDULE CHANGE FROM DAG 2014 - 2015
Service Total Faster On Schedule Slower
Army 31 0 0% 11 35% 20 65%
Navy 11 1 9% 4 36% 6 55%
RCAF 16 1 6% 5 31% 10 63%
Total 58 2 3% 20 34% 36 62%
These projects were also categorized according to both their stage in the procurement process 
and their costs. The analysis of the projects according to the stage in the procurement process 
indicated that the same share of projects in the Identification (37 per cent ), Options Analysis 
(38 per cent ) or Definition (38 per cent ) stages were Early or On Schedule (See Table 3 and 
Figure 1). Second, a greater share of the least and most expensive projects were Early or On 
Schedule: 67 per cent of the projects under $20 million; 50 per cent of the projects between 
$500 million and $1.5 billion; and 43 per cent of the projects over $1.5 billion (Table 4 and 
Figure 2). 
TABLE 3 PROGRESS BY PROCUREMENT STAGE
Project Phase Early or On Schedule
Identification 37%
Options Analysis 38%
Definition 38%
TABLE 4 PROGRESS BY COST ($M)
Project Cost ($M) <20 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500-1,500 >1,500
Early or On Schedule 67% 33% 38% 33% 30% 50% 43%
249 
Interviews with RCAF and RCN Subject Matter Experts (Ottawa: 2015).
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FIGURE 1
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EXPLANATION OF VARIANCE:250
The explanations provided for why the Early projects had advanced their milestones pointed 
to two different reasons. In one case, the project was part of a multi-national consortium, 
so Canada’s procurement system needed to align with an external time pressure. In another 
instance, the project had spent so long in the Options Analysis stage that this facilitated a 
shorter than expected Definition stage.
Three primary issues have been cited as causes of delay for the Late projects.251 A lack of 
capacity was cited as a major impediment to progress, as the project sponsors in the Army, 
RCN and RCAF lack adequate staff to progress all their projects on their desired schedules. 
Even leaving aside the projects which have no staff assigned to them, some of the Late projects 
included in Table 2 were delayed because of a lack of adequate staff resources. A second 
significant issue was funding. Many other projects that are sponsor priorities are not included in 
DND’s 2014 investment plan. As a result, they cannot receive Definition approval, and become 
funded projects, until the portfolio of projects identified for inclusion through the Capability 
Investment Plan Program Review are actually approved for inclusion in DND’s Investment 
Plan. In some cases, they were on the secondary list of important projects identified through 
the Capability Investment Plan Program Review process, but are not part of the portfolio of 
projects identified for inclusion in the 2014 investment plan. A third source of delay is project 
interdependencies, particularly for the RCAF. A number of the RCAF’s projects are related 
to management of Canada’s existing fighter fleet and the acquisition of a future fighter. Their 
delay is therefore tied to progress on the future fighter project, which has made no progress 
since 2012.
250 
Confidential Interviews
251 The delays with those projects also listed in Annex 1 are not re-examined here.
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TABLE 5 ACTIVE ARMY PROJECTS
84mm Ammunition
84mm Carl Gustaf Upgrade
Active Radio Frequencies Protection Systems
Advanced IED Detection and Defeat
Advanced Water Supply System
Airspace Coordination Center Modernization
Armoured Combat Support Vehicle
C6 GPMG Modernization
C16 Digital Compass Upgrade
CF Land Electronic Warfare Modernization
Close Combat Modular Fighting Rig
Common Remote Weapon System
Combined/Joint Intelligence Modernization
Domestic and Arctic Mobility Enhancement
Enhanced Recovery Capability
FOO/FAC Modernization
Ground Based Air and Munitions Defence
High Risk Search Capability
Indirect Fire Modernization
Joint Deployable HQ and Signal Regiment Modernization
Land Vehicles Crew Training System
LAV Operational Requirements Integration  
Task Mobility Upgrade
LAV OPV Crew Commander Independent Viewer
Land Command Support System Intelligence  
Surveillance Reconnaisance Modernization
Land Command Support System Tactical Command  
and Control Information System Modernization
Land Command Support System Tactical Communications 
Modernization
Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled Recapitalization
RDX Replacement
Small Arms Modernization
Tactical Observer Fire Control System Upgrade
Unit Weapons Training System
Weapon Effects Simulation Mid Life Upgrade
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TABLE 6 ACTIVE RCN PROJECTS
Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship
Canadian Surface Combatant
Joint Support Ship
Maritime Satellite Communications Upgrade
Multi Role Boat
Naval Large Tug
Naval Remote Weapon Station
RCN Intelligence Surveillance Tracking Acquisition  
and Reconnaissance Programme
StrongBow
Submarine Equipment Life Extension
Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade
TABLE 7 ACTIVE RCAF PROJECTS
1 CFFTS Tactical Mission Training  
System Replacement
CC-130J Block 8 Upgrade
CC-138 Twin Otter Life Extension Project
CH-149 Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade
Future Fighter Capability
Future Pilot Training
Griffon Limited Life Extension
Joint Unmanned Surveillance and  
Target Acquisition System
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile Sustainment
Omnibus Aviation Life Support  
Equipment Modernization
On-Scene Control Emergency  
Response Modernization
Royal Canadian Air Force Aerial  
Fire Fighting Vehicle
Royal Canadian Air Force Simulation  
Implementation Project
Search and Rescue Mission  
Management System Replacement
Tactical Integrated Command, Control  
and Communications Air
Weapon System Trainers
Legend
Early
On Schedule
Late
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ANNEX 3: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN): A public notice indicating to the supplier 
community the intent to award a contract to a pre-identified supplier, thereby allowing other 
suppliers to signal their interest in bidding, by submitting a statement of capabilities. If no 
supplier submits a statement of capabilities that meets the requirements set out in the ACAN, 
on or before the closing date stated in the ACAN, the contracting officer may then proceed with 
the award to the pre-identified supplier.
Department of National Defence (DND)
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)
Effective Project Approval (EPA): Within National Defence, internal approval for the selected 
option and to proceed to the project’s Implementation stage. Within the Treasury Board, 
expenditure authority to implement the project. 
Full Operational Capability (FOC): The milestone reached when all project deliverables have 
been delivered
Initial Operational Capability (IOC): The milestone reached when the capability provided by 
the project can be used operationally on a sustained basis
In-Service Support (ISS): Activities required to sustain the operation of a military fleet over 
its lifetime, including engineering, training, inspection, maintenance and repair of equipment, 
and provision of spare parts.
Preliminary Project Approval (PPA): Within National Defence, internal approval in principle 
for the preferred option at the estimated cost and to proceed to the project’s Definition stage. 
Within the Treasury Board, authorization to expend resources for the project’s Definition stage. 
Request for Proposal (RFP): A form of bid solicitation used when the bidder selection is 
based on best value rather than on price alone. Should be used when, owing to the nature of the 
requirement, suppliers are invited to propose a solution to a problem, requirement or objective, 
and the selection of the contractor is based on the effectiveness of the proposed solution.
Statement of Operational Requirement (SOR): A document stating characteristics that must 
be delivered for the project to satisfy the needed capability; contains the critical performance 
criteria necessary to evaluate technical options.
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